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COMMENT
DEPENDENT INDEPENDENCE: APPLICATION OF
THE NUNAVUT MODEL TO NATIVE HAWAIIAN
SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION CLAIMS
Jeffrey Wutzke*
Introduction
In the late summer of 1996, Native Hawaiians voted to "elect delegates to
propose a Native Hawaiian government."' What exactly a "Native Hawaiian
government" meant for purposes of the referendum was left undefined;2 the
possibilities range from complete independence from the United States,3 to the
creation of some type of "state within a state" jurisdiction, to some form of
state-chartered corporation or council.4 Whatever its ultimate goal, the Native
Hawaiian sovereignty movement is simply the most recent, and certainly not the
last, in a series of efforts by aboriginal' bands in Canada and the United States
to achieve a greater say in how their people are governed, their land managed,
and their culture preserved.6 This comment uses the self-determination claims
*J.D., 1998, University of Virginia School of Law; M.S., 1993, University of California,
Berkeley; A.B., 1988, Dartmouth College. Starting as an Associate at Latham & Watkins' San
Francisco office in the fall of 1998. I would like to thank Professors A. E. Dick Howard, Martha
Asbury, and David Suski.
1. Ellen Nakashima, Native Hawaiians ConsiderAskingfor their lslands Back: 100-Year-Old
Cause Spurs Sovereignty Vote, WASH. Posr, Aug. 27, 1996, at Al. Voting was done by mail;
the ballots were sent out on July 1, and had to be returned by August 15. The final tally was
22,294 votes ae, or yes, for the referendum; this represents 73% of the 30,423 eligible votes cast.
Reuter, Hawaiians Vote to Start Process for Sovereignty, WASH. POST, Sep. 13, 1996, at A4;
Hawaiian Sovereignty Election Council, HSEC - Current Update (visited Mar. 8, 1997)
<http'J/planet-hawaii.convhsec/alert.html>.
2. Reuter, supra note 1.
3. That independence is a goal of at least some Native Hawaiian sovereignty activists, and
not merely academic speculation, is evidenced by statements made by some of the referendum's
supporters. See infra Part III.E.
4. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the corporate and municipal forms of U.S. tribal
association.
5. This comment generally uses the term "aborigine" rather than "Indian" or "Native
American"; similarly, this comment uses the Canadian term of choice, "First Nation," to refer to
aboriginal nations in Canada. The term "Native Hawaiian" (Kanaka Maoli in Hawaiian) refers
to the descendants of the original inhabitants of Hawaii, and not to the descendants of Europeans
or Americans who immigrated to the islands before their annexation by the United States. The
term is used more broadly than in the U.S. Code, which defines Native Hawaiian as "any
descendant of not less than one-half part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands
before January 1, 1778." 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-12(d)(1) (1994); 16 U.S.C. § 396a(b) (1994).
6. Charles F. Wilkinson, Land Tenure in the Pacific: The Context for Native Hawaiian Land
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of the Inuit, in northern Canada, as a point of comparison to the Native
Hawaiian sovereignty movement. Specifically, the Canadian federal
government's response to the Inuit claims - to carve a new territory, Nunavut,
out of the Northwest Territories in 1999 - is examined as a possible model for
the Native Hawaiian sovereignty movement. Although these two peoples are
distinguishable in many ways, such a comparison is feasible because of certain
basic underlying similarities between the Inuit and Native Hawaiian claims and
the broader administrative environment in which they are addressed.
Some of these similarities lie on the aboriginal side of the equation. While
it is certainly true that'North American aborigines are a diverse people with
hundreds of distinct cultures,7 it is also true that these peoples' similarity of
situation and treatment allow for reasonable comparisons and contrasts!0 As
Fergus Bordewich notes:
"[T]he Indian," as such, really exists only in the leveling lens of
federal policy and in the eyes of those who continue to prefer
natives of the imagination to real human beings. There are,
however, certain common threads that link the broader experience
of modem Indian tribes as they pursue their quest for
[sovereignty]?
North American aboriginal groups participate in a variety of cross-border
sharing of advocacy and negotiation techniques,"0 using the latest in
Rights, 64 WASH. L. REv. 227, 231 (1989).
7. Noelle M. Kahanu & Jon M. Van Dyke, Native Hawaiian Entitlement to Sovereignty:
An Overview, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 427, 432-33 & 445 (1995) (listing 499 "tribal groups" with
federal recognition and 136 without); Bureau of Indian Affairs, American Indian Today (visited
Mar. 27, 1997) <http://www.doi.gov/bia/aitoday/aitoday.html> (listing 554 units of governance
and over 250 languages).
8. The social welfare conditions of aborigines in Canada and the United States is both
comparable and far below that of the majority population on both sides of the border. See Sharon,
O'Brien, The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing Tribal Sovereignty, Economies and Families, 53
FORDHAM L. REv. 315 (1984); see also Brad W. Morse, A View from the North: Aboriginal and
Treaty Issues in Canada, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 671, 674-75 (1995) (noting many similarities
in culture, historical treatment, and current socioeconomic condition between Canadian and U.S.
aboriginal bands) (Morse is the Executive Assistant to Canada's Federal Minister of Indian Affairs
and Northern Development). But cf Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 428 ("Many
Hawaiians ... want to develop a status that provides more autonomy than that provided to
Indians and other Native Americans."). Even the idea that the Native Hawaiians as a group are
united in their political views or express common cultural traits may be suspect. See Andrew
Hiroshi Aoki, American Democracy in Hawai'i: Finding a Place for Local Culture, 17 U. HAW.
L. REV. 605, 606 (1995); Elizabeth Pa Martin, Hawaiian Natives Claims of Sovereignty and Self-
Determination, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 273, 281-82 (1991).
9. FERGUS M. BORDEWICH, KILLING THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN: REINVENTINO NATIVE
AMERIcANs AT THE END OF THE TWENTIErH CENTURY 18-19 (1996).
10. See, e.g., R. v. Lovelace, 38 C.R.R.2d 297, 298 (1996) (noting that U.S. tribes' success





On the governmental side, basic similarities between Canada and the United
States include both constitutional tenets and federal policy regarding aboriginal
self-determination. These similarities flow from a shared political foundation,
including notions about sovereignty, federalism, separation of powers, the Rule
of Law, and the common law judicial system, including private property
rights."2 This political foundation stems largely from their joint administration
as British colonies until the American Revolution. 3 A second policy-level
foundation follows from the cross-border influence of each country's aboriginal
policy on the other.4
same); Morse, supra note 8, at 673; Raidza Torres, The Rights of Indigenous Populations: The
Emerging International Norm, 16 YALE J. INVL L. 127, 174 (1991).
11. E.g., Bill Henderson, Aboriginal Law and Legislation (visited Sep. 19, 1996)
<http://www.bloorstreet.com/300block/ablawleg.htmn> (listing aboriginal laws of Canada, the
United States, New Zealand, and Australia) [hereinafter Henderson, Aboriginal Law]; Indian
Health Service, Native American Resources on the Internet (visited Mar. 27, 1997)
<http.//www.tueson.ihs.gov/1amerind/ai.html> (listingseveral dozen otherweb sites foraboriginal
groups and information, including Canadian sources); Inuit Circumpolar Conference, About Us
(visited Mar. 26, 1997) <http-//www.inusiaat.comicemain-icc.htm> (group representing Inuit in
Canada, Greenland, Russia, and the United States, and having NGO status at the U.N.); see also
American Indian Movement, American Indian Movement (visited Mar. 15, 1997)
<http.//dickshovel.netgate.netAIMIntro.html> (rights advocacy group); Indianworld, Mending the
Sacred Circle (visited Mar. 15, 1997) <http://www.indianworld.org> (cultural preservation group).
12. Morse, supra note 8, at 672 & 676-77 ("we share many essential elements when it comes
to Aboriginal issues"; recall that Morse is Executive Assistant to Canada's Minister of Indian
Affairs and Northern Development); see also R. v. Van der Peet, 109 C.C.C. 3d 1, 32 (1996)
(Lamar, C.J.C.) (noting for the Canadian Supreme Court that early U.S. aboriginal rights cases,
such as Johnson v. M'Intosh and Worcester v. Georgia, "are as relevant to Canada as they are to
the United States") (citing Brian Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal Rights, 66 CAN. BAR REV.
727, 739 (1987)); R. v. Van der Peet, 83 C.C.C. 3d 289, 315 (1993) (Lambert, J., dissenting)
("[H]armony between the rights of Indians on each side of the 49th parallel should be what one
would expect if the common law on both sides of the border were applied to the same customs,
traditions and practices on both sides of the border."); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall, 698 F.
Supp. 1504, 1515 (,V.D. Vash. 1988) (citing decisions of the British Columbian Supreme Court
in a U.S. case with comparable facts); Jeffrey L. Friesen, The Distribution of Treaty-Implementing
Powers in Constitutional Federations: Thoughts on the American and Canadian Models, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1415 (1994).
13. John T. Cross & Kristin M. Lomond, The Civil Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of the
United States and Canada, 10 ARrz. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 253, 253 (1993).
14. See, e.g., R. v. Recalma, 1996 Can. Tax Ct. LEXIS 2523, at *7 (June 17, 1996)
(comparing Canadian and U.S. restrictions on non-federal taxing of Native Americans); Brian R.
Campbell, Casting a Net Into Turbulent Waters: Indian Salmon Fishing Rights in Canada and
the United States, 3 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENvm. L & POL'Y 101, 106 (1994) (adding that "[ifn
Canada, legal relations between First Nations and the government are just as strained as those
south of the border."); Cross & Lomond, supra note 13, passim; Ralph W. Johnson, Fragile
Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy Toward Indians, 66 WASH. L. REV.
643, passim (1991); Morse, supra note 8, at 672 (observing that "[t]he knowledge of the
successes and failures that have occurred in Canada can provide an excellent reference point from
which to assess how these same issues have evolved in the territory now known as the [U.S.]"
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This comment begins in Part I with a discussion of what is meant by the
terms "sovereignty" and "self-determination" under international law. This
discussion will show that the terms can be applied, albeit inexactly, to virtually
all aboriginal groups in North America, and especially those of both the Inuit
and the Native Hawaiians. Parts II and I canvass the history of
aboriginalfederal government interaction in North America. Given the timespan
and the great diversity of aboriginal peoples, geography, and governmental
policies involved, this treatment is of necessity broad, capturing only the major
themes and highlights appropriate to the analysis of aboriginal self-determination
claims and the particulars of the Inuit and Native Hawaiian nations. Part II
focuses on historical and contemporary Canadian aboriginal policies. The Inuit,
their claims, and the Canadian Nunavut Agreement are described more fully in
Part II.D-E. Part III reviews U.S. historical and contemporary aboriginal
policies. Parts rII.C-D examine more closely the history of Native Hawaiians
and their annexation by the United States. Part IV then revisits the definitions
of sovereignty and self-determination presented in Part I, analyzing the
applicability of the Nunavut model to Native Hawaiian claims in light of the
preceding discussion. For reasons peculiar to the differences between Canada
and the United States, the Nunavut model of strong aboriginal self-determination
is ultimately inapplicable to the Native Hawaiian setting, whether the ultimate
Native Hawaiian goal is obtaining the status of a mainland-style tribe or
becoming an independent nation-state. Moreover, outright independence for the
Native Hawaiians is neither likely nor desirable due to distinctions between
aboriginal and colonial peoples in the doctrines of sovereignty and self-
determination. Instead, a middle approach emphasizing the flexibility inherent
in a federal system of government is both more likely to occur and more suited
to the Native Hawaiians' full range of needs.
L The Concept of Sovereignty
[A] sovereign government unlike a free individual is Janus-faced:
it simultaneously faces both outward at other states and inward at
its population.
- Robert Jackson
While there is a large body of United States jurisprudence addressing
American tribes as "dependent domestic nations,"" what Native Hawaiian and
other aboriginal groups seek today conceivably goes far beyond the notion of
limited sovereignty to "encompass outright independence."6 Therefore an
and noting the "many" aboriginal bands that straddle the CanadianlU.S. border).
15. See infra Part III.A (discussing the development of the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment
of Native American tribal sovereignty).




accurate application of the Nunavut model to the Native Hawaiian claim begins
by examining what international lawyers and publicists mean by the terms
"sovereignty" and "self-determination."
A. "Sovereignty"
In international law, "sovereignty" means constitutional independence from
other states. It is "a legal, absolute, and unitary condition" in which a state acts
independently, free from nonconsensual constraints. 7 "The most fundamental
element of sovereignty is the right to choose and establish a form of
government."'"
Publicists, including Robert Jackson, describe a distinction between "external"
or "negative" sovereignty and "internal" or "positive" sovereignty. 9 The first
type of sovereignty "connotes equality of status between the states"" and
requires "freedom from outside interference."'" The latter, internal or positive
sovereignty entails "the exercise of supreme authority ... within [states']
individual territorial boundaries"' and allows governments "the wherewithal to
provide political goods for its citizens... "A sovereign has authority over
people and territory within its boundaries regardless of their citizenship or the
land titles."'  Jackson adds that it is positive sovereignty that allows
governments to "collaborate with other governments in defense alliances and
similar international arrangements and reciprocate in international commerce and
finance."'
B. "Self-Determination"
Self-determination is closely linked to concepts of sovereignty; what
sovereignty is to governments, self-determination is to peoples. Jackson notes
17. ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD 25 (London, 1986).
18. Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 445.
19. See GEOFFERY L. GOODWIN, THE EROSION OF ExTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY, IN BETWEEN
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRATION 100 (Ghita Ionescu ed., 1975); ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-
STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND THE THIRD WORLD 27-29 (1990). This
distinction can also be found in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on tribal sovereignty. See
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 425-26
(1989) (stating that "an Indian tribe generally retains sovereignty by way of tribal self-government
and control over other aspects of its internal affairs" but "[a] tribe's inherent sovereignty .. . is
divested to the extent it is inconsistent with the tribe's dependent status, that is, to the extent it
involves a tribe's 'external relations') (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313, 326 (1978) and citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)).
20. GOODWIN, supra note 19, at 100.
21. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 27.
22. GOODWIN, supra note 19, at 100.
23. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 29.
24. David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1588 (1996).
25. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 29.
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that "[s]overeignty [today is] based on a universal doctrine of categorical self-
determination which [does] not presuppose underlying nationhood but only
subject colonial status."' As such, the people, not "princes," are the basis of
authority; "self' means nation, whether defined by political tradition or ethnic
characteristics, and "determination" means the capacity of those people to
establish an independent government based on their own constitution. The
United States is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which states that "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development."' To Bertrand de Jouvenel,
"[t]he essential freedom [is] to create a gathering, to generate a group, and
thereby introduce in society a new power, a source of movement and
change.
2 ?
The U.N. Charter, and that of its predecessor, the League of Nations, both
reference self-determination, 3 although it is listed in the former as a "principle"
rather than an "obligation."'" The U.N. General Assembly has also approved
"a succession" of resolutions which have shaped the modem international law
doctrine of self-determination "as a categorical right of all colonial peoples.""-
C. Applying the Definitions
1. Aboriginal Sovereignty Generally
An examination of aboriginal arguments for sovereignty reveals the
characteristics desired by aboriginal leaders for their governments - internally
the ability to regulate and provide for their own people, which includes the right
to form a government, determine membership, legislate, administer justice, and
provide a stable economic environment; externally equality of status, and
freedom of decision making?3 De Jouvenel associates these characteristics with
the core notion of "justice": "to guarantee to each nation, the weak as well as
the strong, the tranquil enjoyment of what each had had."' Indeed Jackson
26. ld at 75.
27. Id at 75.
28. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M.
368 (1967), ratified Sept. 8, 1992.
29. BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, SOVEREIGNTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POLITICAL GOOD 299
(J.F. Huntington, trans., 1957).
30. Id. at 141.
31. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 76 (citing U.N. charter arts. I & 55).
32. Id. at 76 (emphasis added) (citing U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 421/1950,
637/1952, and 1188/1957).
33. Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 437-42; Reuter, supra note 1; Judith V. Royster
& Rory Snowarrow Fausett, Fresh Pursuit onto Native American Reservations: State Rights To
Pursue Savage Hostile Indian Marauders Across the Border', 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 191, 276
(1988) [hereinafter Royster & Snowarrow Fausett, Fresh Pursuit].




notes that the latter has been intimately associated with the concept of
decolonization: "it is the distinctive liberty acquired by former colonies as a
consequence of the international enfranchisement movement."35
The aboriginal claim to sovereignty can be said to extend from two bases:
historical right and modem treatment. The first strand emphasizes that all North
American aboriginal bands were once sovereign entities. A modem discussion
of aboriginal sovereignty (including this one) must take place within the context
of the existing state territorial system, based on European norms. Indeed the
very idea of a sovereign nation-state "[is] a European concept that.., never
existed in pre-Columbian America."'  Yet before this system was
established - before European contact with North America - there can be no
question that sovereignty existed among the aboriginal inhabitants of the
continent. Where that sovereignty resided - the clan, the village, the tribe
or language group, or a federation" - varied depending on the people in
question, but in the absence of outside interference these people can be said to
have been sovereign in their own right?9 In spite of, or perhaps because of,
this ex-cultural origin of certain governance concepts, "tribal concepts of
governmental authority often hinge on moral constructs that differ from the
European notions of 'sovereignty' and 'self-determination."'"
2. The Native Hawaiian Claim
The irony, of course, is that, with the possible exception of the Iroquois
(Hodenosaunee), Native Hawaiians had the most organized and developed of
governments with which to meet European (and American) pressures in North
America. Certainly the Hawaiian monarchy was the most recent of the
aboriginal governments in terms of time, and it also had more clearly defined
aboriginal sovereignty claims from aboriginal claims over a traditional or current land base. See
infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
35. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 27.
36. BORDEWICH, supra note 9, at 313.
37. See Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. at 425 (stating that "[pirior to the European
settlement of the New World, Indian tribes were'self-governing sovereign political communities'")
(quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322-33); Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 428 ("Indian tribes
exercised self-governance and self-determination long before the establishment of the United
States of America."). But cf. infra text accompanying note 310.
38. For example, the Iroquois (Hodenosaunee) were a federation of tribes in what is now the
northeastern United States. JACK WEATHERFORD, INDIAN GIVERS 121-23, 128-30, 135-36, 145
(1988).
39. But cf. BoRDawicH, supra note 9, at 71 ("Although the principle of tribal sovereignty
rests on the premise that modem tribes are the direct continuation of nations that pre-date the
founding of the United States, the governments of all but a few are wholly a twentieth-century
invention.").
40. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role
of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 228 (1996).
41. See WEATHERFORD, supra note 38, at 135-43.
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boundaries and stronger international recognition than mainland tribes. The
independence of the Hawaiian monarchy had been recognized in treaties with
European powers' as well as the United States.43 As Secretary of State Daniel
Webster wrote:
The United States have regarded the existing authorities in the
Sandwich Islands [Hawaiian Islands] as a govemment suited to the
condition of the people, and resting on their own choice;... [T]he
President [is] quite willing to declare, as the sense of the
Government of the United States, that the Government of the
Sandwich Islands ought to be respected; that no power ought either
to take possession of the islands as a conquest, or for the purpose
of colonization, and that no power ought to seek for any undue
control over the existing government.'
3. The Inuit Claim
The Inuit also have a colorable historical claim to sovereignty, albeit from
a different angle. Assertions of sovereignty, whether European or aboriginal,
must generally be accompanied by permanent occupation.4 The Inuit did not
have a single, centralized government either before or after contact with
Europeans; their society consisted of somewhat isolated fishing villages
distributed throughout the Canadian Arctic, and was (and is) closely linked to
that of other Arctic people in coastal Europe and Asia." The permanent
occupation standard is somewhat subjective, however, especially as regards the
inhospitable polar regions.47 Because the Inuit at that time were able to engage
in trade and transit and maintain internal order, they had a valid claim to
sovereignty even at this late date. Furthermore, Canada did not begin to assert
42. Jennifer M.L. Chock, One Hundred Years of Illegitimacy: International Legal Analysis
of the Illegal Overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy, Hawaii's Annexation, and Possible
Reparations, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 463, 464 (1995) (listing Austro-Hungarian, Belgian, Danish,
Dutch, Japanese, Italian, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Swedish-Norwegian, and Swiss treaties
with the Hawaiian monarchy); Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 228 n.11.
43. Francis Anthony Boyle, Restoration of the Independent Nation State of Hawaii Under
International Law, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 723, 727 (1995); Mililani B. Trask, Historical and
Contemporary Hawaiian Self-Determination: A Native Hawaiian Perspective, 8 ARIZ. J. IN1'L &
COMP. L. 77, 80 (1991).
44. RALPH S. KuYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM 1778-1854, at 194 (1938, 1968 ed.)
(quoting Daniel Webster to Haalilio and Richards (agents of Hawaii) (Dec. 19, 1842)).
45. GUSTAV SMEDAL, DE L'AQuISION DE SOUVERAINET9 SUR LES TERRITOIRES POLAIRES
53 (Pierre Rokseth, trans., Rousseau et Cie., ed. 1932) (occupation must be "durable et rdel").
46. See Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 11; see also infra notes 162-66 and
accompanying text.
47. SMEDAL, supra note 45, at 51.
48. Id. at 51 ("1l va sans dire que si l'autorit6 locale devait etre en 6tat de faire respecter les




sovereignty over the Arctic shore and islands until 1907,49 and did not begin
substantive administrative actions in the region until 1922.'
4. Additional Factors in the Sovereignty Equation
In addition to the historical sovereignty foundation, aboriginal claims to a
right of self-determination follow from their treatment within the larger nation-
state, including concerns over governmental legitimacy, group identity (here
indelibly tied to race as a defining characteristic),' and the role of the
legislative process versus the legal system in defining and protecting aboriginal
rights. Leon Dion notes that internal struggles of the type being pursued by the
Native Hawaiians are in part directed against a state's leaders "for their failure
to act according to the values in which they claim to believe (liberty, equality,
human dignity, etc.) or again, for their inability to redefine and adjust these
values to the demands of the present."'
What is called into question today is not some dysfunctionings
in the social and political systems which, when all is said and done,
are easily remedied. The crisis extends to the legitimacy of the
organizations and leaders; to the integration of its members in the
political system; to the involvement of its members in the life of the
organizations, to the rules and processes which decide how goods
and services are to be shared between individuals and
collectivities.53
The factors influencing this strand of the aboriginal sovereignty claim are
complex. Nevertheless the social welfare based claim would seem, on first
population indigane peut 8tre nombreuse et belliqueuse, iI dtait indispensable de ]a doter de
moyens coercitifs importants.").
49. Id. at 44-45 ("A ce sujet, rappelon qu'en 1907 le sdnateur canadien M. Poirier 6mit une
proposition tendant A faire d6eclarer que le Canada prenait possession des «terres et Ies> situ6es
entre sa c6te septentrionale et le p6le Nord.").
50. Id. at 53 ("C<Le ministare de l'Intdrieur, section des Territoires du Nord-Ouest, a organis6
en 1922 une expdition dont le r~sultat a t6 rNstablissement de stations de police, de douane et
de poste en divers endroits de la region septentrionale, avee le dessein d'tablir chaque annde
d'autres stations semblables jusqu'A faire respecter, en toute certitude, le lois et ordonnances du
Canada dans les contries qui sont soumises au contr6le de ces postes avances de la
civilisation.>"); see also David F. Pelly, "The Faces of Nunavik," CAN. GEOGRAPHIC, Jan. 1995,
at 24 (quoting one Inuk as saying that the Province of Qudbec, though granted lands north to
Baffin Sound in 1912, see infra note 106, did not "move in with their infrastructure" until 1964).
51. BORDEWICH, supra note 9, at 13 (stating that "tribal sovereignty [bestowed] practical
autonomy upon groups of people whose very identity was, at least arguably, based on obsolete
ideas of race and ethnicity").
52. L.on Dion, Anti-Politics and Marginals, in BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRATION
34 (Ghita lonescu ed., 1975).
53. Id. at 34-35 (citing LON DION, SOCIE'TI ET POLITIQUE: LA VIE DES GROUPeS: VOLUME
2, DYNAMIQUE DE LA Socit'ri LIBtRALE 469-70 (Presses de l'universitd Laval 1971)).
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blush, to fit within the decolonization body of international law dealing with
ethnic group sovereignty and self-determination.
The reader should note the important connection between calls for aboriginal
sovereignty and calls for control over a land base for the aboriginal population.
"[lit is gross violations of human rights that commonly create a minority's
need .. . for a specific territorial base."' In addition, land rights "form the
foundation for the exercise of other rights. 'and is not just real estate... land
is part of the essence of who indigenous people are. It needs to be understood
within the context of their spirituality and their holistic sense of creation and
humaniv ... [a] landless indigenous person is a person at real risk.""'S Others
go even further, and argue that the loss of control over land is more damaging
to aboriginal bands than the loss of internal sovereignty.' For all these
speakers the two concepts, sovereignty and land, interweave closely; 7 for the
Native Hawaiian claim the connection seems even more obvious!' For
example, the essence of the minimal Native Hawaiian goal, a "traditional tribal
model," is a federally recognized tribe with a defined land base held in trust by
the federal government." At the same time lands historically (preannexation)
held by the chiefs and monarch of the Hawaiian government' now rest in the
hands of the State of Hawaii and the U.S. government, accessible to Native
Hawaiians only through application and permit. The potential severability of
land-based claims from the other sovereignty issues, however, could prove to
be a useful tool for addressing the self-determination or internal sovereignty
claim.
Finally, this comment does not venture to tie in discussions of "cultural
sovereignty" or the interaction of native religious ideas, ancient and modem, to
the right of self-determination: Although some authors see these subjects as
"linked inextricably, because the ultimate goal of political sovereignty is the
54. HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 465 (1990).
55. Alexandra Kersey, The Nunavut Agreement: A Model for Preserving Indigenous Rights,
11 ARIZ. .1. INT'L & COMp. L. 429, 446 (1994) (citing Lucia Mouat, Indigenous People Press for
Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONrrOR, June 9, 1993, at 9 (quoting Reverend Paul Reeves, Anglican
Communion observer at the U.N. and former Governor-General of New Zealand)).
56. Getches, supra note 24, at 1584.
57. Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States,
90 AM. J. INT'L L. 590 (1996); Torres, supra note 10, at 133, 138; Alex Tallchief Skibine, Braid
of Feathers: Pluralism, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, and the Importance of Tribal Court
Jurisprudence 96 COLUM. L. REV. 557 (1996) (reviewing FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF
FEATHERS (1995)) [hereinafter Tallchief Skibine, Braid].
58. Iahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 444-45 (emphasizing that "the limited land and
natural resources available in Hawaii" make it "imperative" that Native Hawaiians have control
over a land base); see infra Parts III.D & E.
59. Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 432.




protecting of a way of life,'' viewing "political sovereignty" (or self-
determination generally) as a goal in its own right is equally valid - that is,
aboriginal peoples can be in control of their own lives, whatever expressions of
culture and society they adopt. Indeed, whatever the cultural outlook of the
governing structure, the modem aboriginal expression of sovereignty and self-
determination will require such everyday tenets of the modern bureaucratic state
as tax codes, environment and development regulations, and some form of
judicial system.'
II. Canadian Aboriginal Policies
A. The Common, Colonial Period
Several practices initiated during the colonial period by the European powers
continue to impact Canadian and U.S. federal aboriginal policies, and more
specifically the topic of aboriginal sovereignty and self-determination.'
Important among these practices were the conquest-oriented approach of the
European powers, the development of the reservation system, and the initiation
of the use of treaties as a means of interaction between European states and
aborigines at the formal level.
The first association between North American aborigines and Europeans
centered on a trading relationship. The French and English, in particular, vied
for decades for the native fur trade.' For example, the English monarch
Charles II created the Hudson's Bay Company in 1670,' granting it exclusive
trading rights for a large tract of north-central North America.' While trading
contacts increased the aborigines' impact on the surrounding wildlife resources
and altered the aboriginal economy, making aborigines increasingly dependent
on traders for manufactured goods,' they did not necessarily implicate a
61. BORDEWICH, supra note 9, at 171, 210; see also supra text accompanying note 55.
62. Il at 71, 171, 210; see also M.R. Franks, Sovereignty, Statehood, and Self-Determination
Claims to Statehood in International Law, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 231, 232-33 (1994)
(reviewing Nil LANTE WALLACE-BRUcE, SOVEREIGNTY, STATEHOOD, AND SELF-DETERMINATION
CLAIMS TO STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1994)) (examining the idea of statehood and
examining alternatives to statehood for aboriginal peoples).
63. James [Sakej] Youngblood Henderson, Empowering Treaty Federalism, 58 SASK. L.
REV. 241, 245 (1994) (arguing that "existing federalism reflects political domination and
oppression build on colonial misunderstandings"); see also Treaty Land Entitlement Committee
of Manitoba, Inc. (TLE), A Debt to be Paid - Chapter 1 (visited Dec. 3, 1996)
<http'//www.abinfohwy.ca/tlecomm/debt2.htm> [hereinafter TLE, A Debt To Be Paid Ch. 1].
64. Siegfried Wiessner, American Indian Treaties and Modern International Law, 7 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 567, 570 n.13 (1995). France and England entered treaties between themselves
in 1667 and 1713 to shift trading rights in northern North America. Id.
65. WEATHERFORD, supra note 38, at 22.
66. Id.; TLE, A Debt To Be Paid Ch. 1, supra note 63.
67. See MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE POuTIcs OF INDIAN REMOVAL 17-30 (1982) (detailing the
trading relationships effects on the Creek people specifically); Torres, supra note 10, at 131, 134.
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destruction of aboriginal sovereignty.' The Hudson's Bay Company, for
instance, made only minimal appropriations of land for the occasional trading
post. Its charter, however, was only one of several such unilateral dedications
of jurisdiction,' and points the way to the first of the colonial era's impact on
Canadian and U.S. aboriginal policies.
At the time of conquest, in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, the European
powers did not see any contradiction between their actions and their recognition
of native sovereignty. Although many aboriginal peoples, such as the Aztec or
the Iroquois, had complex governing systems covering large areas and numbers
of people,0 the European powers used the notion of res nullius (or terra
nullius) and asserted their right as "civilized" and Christian states to impose their
authority on those who did not (to them) fit that description Thus the
Europeans saw no contradiction between interacting with these tribal
governments, or even a local band's chief, and at the same time declaring huge
swaths of territory as belonging to a particular colony or trading company,
despite the obvious and permanent aboriginal habitation of such territory n
Indeed it was here that the dichotomy that so strikingly distinguishes the concept
of "aboriginal title" appeared; for the Europeans, the territory was theirs, even
as the title remained in aboriginal hands until severed by conquest or treaty.73
Along the Atlantic seaboard and St. Lawrence River valley permanent
68. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), The Canadian Indians (visited 22 Nov.
1996) <http://www.inac.ge.ca/pubsrindian/french.html> [hereinafter INAC, Canadian Indians:
french.html].
69. See generally OSCAR THEODORE BARCK, JR. & HUGH TULMAGE LEFLER, COLONIAL
AMERICA 81-97 (1958) (describing royal charters to joint-stock companies, such as the
Massachusetts-Bay Company, that led to colonial governments); John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use
Law and Its Significancefor Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1285-87 (1996)
(noting the varying powers of the colonial governments and the British crown under the different
company and colony charters granted over a period of more than a century and a half.
70. Regarding the Aztecs, see, e.g., WEATHERFORD, supra note 38, at 143-44; Adriana De
Aguinaga, The New Agrarian Law - Mexico's Way Out, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 883, 885 (1993);
James J. Kelly, Jr., Article 27 and Mexican Land Reform: The Legacy of Zapata's Dream, 25
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 541, 546-47 (1994). Regarding the Iroquois, see, e.g.,
WEATHERFORD, supra note 38, at 135-43; Julie L. Caldwell-Hill, Environmental Regulation in
Native America, 24 N. KY. L. REv. 81, 82 n.8 (1994); Steven Paul Mcsloy, "Because the Bible
Tells Me So": Manifest Destiny and American Indians, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 37, 43 n.31
(1996); Wiessner, supra note 64, at 574.
71. Getches, supra note 24, at 1577 n.15 (citing Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep 377, 398 (K.B.
1608) ("All infidels are in law perpetui inimici .... And upon this ground there is diversity
between a conquest of a kingdom of a Christian King, and the conquest of a kingdom of an
infidel.")); SMEDAL, supra note 45, at 32; see also supra Part I.C (describing the Inuit's historical
sovereignty claim).
72. Youngblood Henderson refers to this as the "civilization savage dualism of colonial
thought." Youngblood Henderson, supra note 63, at 246.
73. Campbell, supra note 14, at 109 (noting the additional problem of the different concepts
of "property" to American aborigines and Europeans). See also infra notes 85-87 and




agricultural settlements quickly superseded the trading relationships. Settlers
stripped bands of their lands and pushed the natives westward. 4 Individual
bands formed alliances with either of the European powers, depending on
criteria unique to each tribe or band.7 Following France's loss to England in
the French and Indian War, however, the French withdrew from Canada and the
English obtained a monopoly on the future development of aboriginal relations
and laws." More importantly, within a year of the war's end, the British Crown
issued the Royal Proclamation of 1763
Termed "Magna Carta of Indian Rights" by some,7 the Proclamation set
aside, or "reserved," aboriginal lands west of the Appalachians to the Mississippi
River, and north from the Gulf of Mexico to beyond the Great Lakes. This was
not the first reservation of lands to aborigines, but was certainly the largest
to that time and aimed in part to stop settler exploitation of aborigirles.80 The
Proclamation firmly entrenched the idea that a solution to the "Indian problem"
could be had by segregating natives and Europeans into different jurisdictions.'
The American Revolution limited the Proclamation's effect south of the Great
74. See DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE 2-5 (Wash. Sq. Press 1981);
Kersey, supra note 55, at 430.
75. GREEN, supra note 67, at 24-28; Wiessner, supra note 64, at 570; Youngblood
Henderson, supra note 63, at 246.
76. GREEN, supra note 67, at 28. The French and Indian War was somewhat of a war by
proxy, being the North American version of Europe's Seven Years War. The peace treaty ending
this war stipulated that France's aboriginal allies were not to be punished or removed from their
lands. INAC, Canadian Indians: french.html, supra note 68.
77. Royal Proclamation of 1763, George III (U.K.).
78. Bill Henderson, Virtual Law Office (visited Oct. 2, 1996) <http://www.bloorstreet.com/
200block/brintro.htm#45> [hereinafter Henderson, Virtual Law Office].
79. The first reservation was established in 1638 in the Colony of Connecticut, for the
Quinnipiac tribe. BORDEWICM, supra note 9, at 115.
80. This goal, and its self-serving foundation, are explicitly revealed in the Proclamation's
text:
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and the
Security of our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes... who live under our
Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of such parts of
our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by Us,
are reserved to them or any of them as their Hunting Grounds....
... and We do further declare ... to reserve under our Sovereignty,
Protection, and Dominion, for the use of said Indians, all the lands [not within
previously described colonial boundaries, or belonging to the Hudson's Bay
Company].
Royal Proclamation of 1763, supra note 77. The Proclamation voided many existing small-scale
(single landowner) land grants in the trans-Appalachian region and enjoined future grants and
purchases there. Id.; see Wiessner, supra note 64, at 570.
81. BORDEWICH, supra note 9, at 116 ("Defiant settlers for the most part ignored the
proclamation, but it had established ethnic separation for the first time as the keystone of
government policy.").
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Lakes, where at any rate it had been neither well received nor well enforced."2
In Canada however the Proclamation continues to have substantive effect," and
is still cited by aboriginal leaders as a source of their aboriginal title to lands."
The third major impact of this colonial period, and one ultimately tied to the
use of land reservations as a policy tool, was the treaty-making process. The
Spanish were the first to make treaties with American aborigines, but it was the
British who developed them into a complex system for interacting with the
aboriginal bands.' Treaties were used for "the subjugation of the indigenous
peoples" through acquiring land,' securing allegiance, and regulating trade."
These treaties can be considered as comparable, both normatively and
textually, to contemporaneous treaties between European states." This view
was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court as early as 1832." Others note that
the original intent of the European states were to treat aboriginal bands as equals
at the negotiating "table." Recently the United Nations has tentatively
recognized that "indigenous peoples" should be treated with the same "honour
and respect" as independent states in the negotiation and enforcement of
treaties. These interpretations on the practice of treaty making support the
historical strand of the aboriginal sovereignty claim."
Nevertheless, as the process of treaty making with aboriginal bands was
continued by the United States, and later Canada, the nature of the treaties
changed. These nineteenth-century tribal treaties do not carry the same force
under international law as do seventeenth- and eighteenth-century interstate
treaties; the latter were "regular alliance and friendship treaties," while the
82. Il at 116.
83. Campbell, supra note 14, at 106; INAC, The Canadian Indians (visited Nov. 22, 1996)
<http'/iww.inac. gc.ca/pubs/indian/rights.htnl> [hereinafter INAC, Canadian Indians: rightshitnl].
84. See infra note 111.
85. Wiessner, supra note 64, at 570. The Spanish and Portuguese use of the treaty process
was minimal; they instead relied on Papal Bulls for their New World authority. Id. at 569 n.9 &
570 n.15. Other European states that engaged in the treaty process with aboriginal bands were
France, Sweden, and The Netherlands. Id. at 569 n.12; see also supra note 64.
86. That is, acquiring title to land, as opposed to acquiring territory. See NORTHWEST
ORIN'ANCE OF 1787 § 8 (U.S.) (providing for laying out of counties, townships, etc, in "parts
of the district in which the Indian titles shall have been extinguished"); see also supra notes 70-
73 and accompanying text.
87. Wiessner, supra note 64, at 569. Treaties affecting aboriginal rights and populations were
also entered into between Europeans powers, and between European states and the United States.
Campbell, supra note 14, at 104-05; see, e.g., supra note 76.
88. Wiessner, supra note 64, at 574-76.
89. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 550 (1832).
90. See Wiessner, supra note 64, at 568 (quoting article 36 of the 1993 Draft Declaration
on the Fights of Indigenous Peoples).
91. See Youngblood Henderson, supra note 63, at 246 ("From the Eurocentric viewpoint,
the European Crowns recognized the sovereignty of the First Nations; hoWever, from a First





former were negotiated "to regularize and channel the removal of Indians from
their traditional vast hunting and fishing grounds to ever smaller ...
reservations."' In addition, the outlook of this later period may have affected
how nineteenth-century aboriginal-policy administrators approached their job.
In 1886 the Commissioner of Indian Affairs stated that .'[ilt is perfectly plain
to my mind that the treaties never contemplated the un-American and absurd
idea of a separate nationality in our midst, with power as they may choose to
organize a government of their own."'93
The use of the practices detailed in this section shows how, even in the early
colonial period, the European states had entrenched the idea that North
American aborigines could be treated both as sovereign, for purposes of
securing trade agreements and title to lands, and as unorganized populations of
a res nullius, on whom the Europeans could legitimately impose their own ideas
of governance and law.
B. First Nations in Canada
The British Parliament created the Canadian confederation with the British
North America Act of 1867 (now termed the Constitution Act, 1867).' The
act established the form and power of the federal government, and the powers
of the provinces within the federal system, intending Canada to have a strong,
centralized federal government." As regards aboriginal rights, the Act gave
legislative jurisdiction over aborigines and their lands to the new federal govern-
ment. Prior to confederation, the provinces had continued the treaty-making
process noted above, to purchase (secure title to) the lands along the eastern
Great Lakes' shores - aboriginal title that had been reserved under the Royal
Proclamation of 1763. These preconfederation treaties include the so-called
"Robinson Treaties" of the 1850s, which covered lands from Ontario to Lake
Superior." Using the Robinson Treaties as a model, the Canadian federal
92. Wiessner, supra note 64, at 576-80; see also Campbell, supra note 14, at 103, 107
(stating that "peace and friendship treaties made prior to confederation" are categorically
distinguishable from later treaties with the Canadian federal government, see infra Part ILB);
Youngblood Henderson, supra note 63, at 248-49 (distinguishing "Georgian treaties made with
'nations and tribes of Indians"' from "Victorian treaties [made with] . . . 'Her Majesty's Indian
subjects"').
93. BORDEWICH, supra note 9, at 118.
94. British North America Act of 1867 (Constitution Act, 1867), 30 & 31 Victoria, ch. 3
(U.K. 1867).
95. Henderson, Virtual Law Office, supra note 78, at I of 19.
96. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 94, § 91 (reserving legislative authority over "Indians
and Lands reserved for the Indians" to Parliament).
97. INAC, Canadian Indians: rights.html, supra note 83. Again, this title acquisition should
be seen as distinct from territorial acquisition; in the provinces' minds (as in the minds of the
British and the U.S. government) the territory was already subject to their nonaboriginal
sovereignty). See supra notes 70-73, 85-87 and accompanying text.
98. INAC, The Canadian Indians (visited Nov. 22, 1996) <http.//www.inac.gc.ca/pubs/
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government negotiated the famous "Numbered Treaties" to take title to
aboriginal lands from the Great Lakes to the Rocky Mountains, and
northwestward to the Mackenzie River delta in the Yukon." The government
negotiated the eleven Numbered Treaties in two waves. Treaties One through
Seven cover territory below the 55th parallel and east of the Canadian Rocky
Mountains (with certain exceptions), and were negotiated between 1871 and
1877. Treaties Eight through Eleven took title to what is today the Yukon
Territory and the western Northwest Territories, and were negotiated between
1899 and 1921.2' In exchange for surrendering aboriginal title to their lands,
the federal government agreed to create reserves for signatory First Nations,
based on the population of the bands covered by each treaty.1 ' Certain other
rights were granted in some treaties,"°a though the First Nations had little say
in the terms included and the size of reserves established.10
At the same time as it assigned aboriginal jurisdiction to the federal
government, the Constitution Act, 1867 also assigned all Crown lands and
resources to the provinces, subject to any existing trusts." Although this
"trust" qualification on the assignment of Crown lands to the provinces included
any reserved aboriginal lands, most reserves were negotiated not only after the
enactment of the Constitution Act, 1867, but also after the creation of the prairie
provinces," and the addition of territory to existing provinces." Thus in
indianlrob.html>. The Robinson Treaties were named for their negotiator. Id.
99. INAC, The Canadian Indians (visited Nov. 22, 1996) <http.//www.inac.gc.ca/pubs/
indian/treat.html>.
100. ld.
101. INAC, The Canadian Indians (visited Nov. 22, 1996) <http:llwww.inac.gc.calpubs/
indian/maj Dr.html> [hereinafter INAC, Canadian Indians: major.htmI]; TLE, A Debt To Be Paid -
Chapter 2 (visited Dec. 03, 1996) <http'/www.abinfohwy.cattlecomndebt3.htm>, at 1 of 2
[hereinafter TLE, A Debt To Be Paid Ch. 2]. Most treaties promised 32 acres of land per member
of the band included; a few raised this figure to 128 acres of land per member. Id., at 2 of 2.
102. 'The promise of schools on reserve in many [t]reaties is seen by First Nations as a
commitment to provide education ... the promise of a medicine chest in one Treaty has been
held by the courts to be a promise of health services." Henderson, Virtual Law Office, supra note
78, at 2 of 19.
103. TLE, A Debt to be Paid Ch. 2, supra note 101, at I of 2.
104. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 94, § 109.
105. A year after confederation, Rupert's Land (the lands of Hudson's Bay Company) was
purchased by the British Parliament, at Canada's request, and added to the confederation. Rupert's
Land Act, 1868, 31-32 Victoria ch. 105 (U.K.); see also Temporary Government of Rupert's Land
Act, 1869, 32-33 Victoria, ch. 3 (Can.) (providing for an ad hoe government for the lands of
Hudson's Bay Company, in expectation that they would soon be joined to the Dominion of
Canada). From this and other adjacent lands, new provinces were created in 1870 (Manitoba) and
1905 (Alberta and Saskatchewan). Manitoba Act of 1870, 33 Victoria ch. 4 (1870) (U.K.);
Alberta Act, 4 & 5 Edw. 7, ch. 3 (1905) (Can.); Saskatchewan Act, 4 & 5 Edw. 7, ch. 42 (1905)
(Can.). British Columbia, the aborigines within which have never entered into treaties, Morse,
supra note 8, at 676, was added to the confederation in 1871. INAC, Canadian Indians:
major.html, supra note 101. This agreement to enter the Dominion hinged on fulfillment of a




many cases the western provinces, and the northern elements of the older
eastern provinces, were delineated before clarification of the outstanding,
underlying aboriginal title. It was not until 1888 that this contradiction was
clarified, in a decision which eroded the federal government's power over
aboriginal policy."m The British Privy Council held that, despite the Numbered
Treaties and the Royal Proclamation of 1763, provincial title "under[lies] the
Indian title," so that the former becomes "plenum dominium whenever that
[Indian] title was surrendered or otherwise extinguished.""lrs As a result, the
Canadian government now needs provincial approval to create reserves by
treaty. In addition, the provinces must agree to any sale of existing reserve
lands to non-Indians."° These restrictions on federal power, along with
statutory restraints,"' impact First Nations' exercise of self-determination,
hindering the establishment of reserves promised to them by the Numbered
Treaties and limiting their ability to control and access their own land base.
The outstanding status of many Numbered Treaty obligations in the prairie
provinces shows the extent of these impacts on aboriginal rights. For example,
one First Nation advocacy group in Manitoba claims that, as of 1977 (over 100
years after enactment of the Manitoba Act), only 2327 square kilometers of
reserves had been created in Manitoba, while claims to an additional 4978
square kilometers remained outstanding.'
the aboriginal use of, and title to, lands in the prairie region. Id.
106. Territory was added to Ontario in 1889, to Qudbec in 1896, and to Manitoba, Ontario,
and Qudbec in 1912. Canada (Ontario Boundary) Act, 1889, 52-53 Victoria, ch. 28 (U.K.); The
Quebec Boundaries Extension Act, 1912, 2 George V, ch. 45 (U.K.).
107. Henderson, Virtual Law Office, supra note 78, at 5 of 19; see also Campbell, supra
note 14, at 108 ("First Nations were ironically dependent on the province transferring title to the
federal government, thereby giving the provincial government a strong hand in Native affairs.").
108. R. v. St. Catherine's Milling & Lumber Co., [1888] 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.).
109. Henderson, Virtual Law Office, supra note 78, at 5 of 19.
110. See Natural Resources Transfer Agreement of 1930, 28 George V, ch. 1 (Can.)
(transferring resource administration to the provinces, with two ramifications for aboriginal
rights - first, it affected the legal analysis to be applied to existing treaty-based rights, and
second, it altered with whom First Nations needed to negotiate for the preservation of rights in
the future). The Supreme Court has held that the harvesting rights of the prairie provinces' First
Nations ended in 1930 with the resources agreements, although aborigines had not been a part
of the transfer negotiations. R. v. Horseman, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901 (Can.). Note that the decision
in this case follows in time the adoption of a more liberal interpretation of aboriginal rights, under
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See infra Part II.C.
111. TLE, A Debt to be Paid -Chapter 4 (visited Dec. 3,1996) <http.//www.abinfohwy.ca/
tlecomn/debt5.htm> [hereinafter TLE, A Debt To Be Paid Ch. 41. Despite transfer of Canada's
reserve establishment obligation to the provinces in 1930, via the Natural Resources Transfer
Agreement, supra note 110, the question of whether or not treaty land entitlement claims are
outstanding is determined between the First Nation in question and the federal government. TLE,
A Debt To Be Paid CI. 4, supra. Signatory bands to other Numbered Treaties have established
groups to help assert and protect their treaty rights against these provinces, including rights
solidified by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. See, e.g., Confederacy of Treaty 6 First Nations,
Treaty Six Mandate (visited Oct. 31, 1996) <http://www.treaty6.orgtmandate/#mandates>;
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The area of Manitoba as a whole is 548,495 square kilometers."' Through
the mid-1970s the other prairie provinces, Alberta and Saskatchewan, faced
similar outstanding land claims. Unfulfilled claims remain in Alberta, but
Saskatchewan reached agreement with its First Nations in 1976."'
C. Modem Canadian Aboriginal Policy
Today the Canadian federal government has two primary expressions of
aboriginal policy: the Indian Act and the Federal Policy Guide produced by the
Ministry of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. In addition the federal and
provincial governments are constrained by sections 25 and 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982.
1. Th Charter of Rights and Freedoms
The Canadian Parliament has had clear and unrestricted right to amend its
constitution for less than two decades; only in 1982 did the British Parliament
"repatriate" the Canadian constitution. 4 The most important development for
aboriginal rights in this constitutional action was the inclusion of section 25 in
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which consists of the first part of 'the
Constitution Act, 1982, and section 35, in the second part of the Act. Section
25 states that "[t]he guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall
not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or
other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada," ''
including the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and any current or future land claims
agreements."' Section 35 provides that "[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and
affirmed." '  All aborigines, including the mixed-ancestry M6tis, are
Treaty 7 Tribal Council, Treaty 7 Home Page (visited Dec. 12, 1996) <http://www.treaty7.org>;
see infra note 203 for a discussion of the creation of Manitoba to address aboriginal rights claims.
112. Statistics Canada, Land and Freshwater Area (visited Apr. 20, 1997) <http'J/
www.stat.can.ca/english/Pgdb/Land/Geography/phys0l.htm>.
113. Government of Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan Indian and Metis Affairs Secretariat -
Mandate (visited Dec. 15, 1996) <http:lwww.sasknet.comlgov/govtlindmetlmandate.htm>;
Government of Saskatchewan, Government News Release 096 (visited Dec. 15, 1996)
<http'/www.sasknet.sk.calsaskgov/newsrelI1996Mar/096.96031406.html>. The provincial
government finally implemented this agreement in 1993. TLE, A Debt To Be Paid - Chapter
6 (visited Dec. 03, 1996) <http'J/www.abinfohwy.ca/tlecomm/debt7.htm>.
114. Constitution Act, 1982 (U.K.). The Canadian constitution is actually a collection of acts
passed by the British, and now Canadian, parliaments between the Quebec Act of 1774 and the
present. See, e.g., Canadian Constitutional Documents (visited Dec. 2, 1996) <http://
insight.dcss.mcmaster.catorg/efc/pages/law/cons/constitutions/canadalengish/cons.html>
(reproducing a schedule attached to the Constitution Act, 1982, that serves as the authoritative
list of the documents that make up the Canadian constitution).
115. Constitution Act, 1982 § 25 (U.K.).
116. Henderson, Virtual Law Office, supra note 78, at 5 of 19.
117. Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 35(l). As one Canadian author noted, "[Section 35]




included under this section. Furthermore, aboriginal rights are not to be
adjudicated as if frozen in time in 1982, but rather as they are further regulated
or negotiated. 9 Associated section 35.1 insures that modem land claims
agreements are considered treaties for the purposes of the section.m Finally,
although section 35 is not within the Charter of Rights and Freedoms per se,
section 35.1 restricts changes to section 35 by requiring consultation with
aboriginal leaders and a constitutional conference before changes can be made.
Since the passage of section 35 and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the
Court has generally (though not consistently) been more liberal in its treaty
interpretations.' Previously the Canadian Supreme Court had had an
inconsistent history in interpreting treaties. Sometimes treaties were found to
extinguish rights despite procedural or even substantive errors;'" alternating
with these decisions were others in which the court upheld protected rights."
In addition, until 1990 aboriginal rights could be regulated by any level of
government, including the provinces." Because of the ongoing uncertainties
regarding the reasoning the court will apply, and the court's awareness of the
regional issues threatening Canadian unity in the western provinces, the judicial
branch of the federal government cannot be said to be the best choice for the
as enduring sources of constitutional law." Youngblood Henderson, supra note 63, at 244.
118. The Mdtis are people classified separately from Indians or the Inuit. Descendants of
aborigines and European traders, they formed a large part of the aboriginal population of the
prairie region, where they "developed a lifestyle that combined the hunting traditions of nomadic
Indians with the more settled ways of European newcomers. INAC, The Canadian Indians
(visited Nov. 22, 1996) <http://www.inac.gc.ca/pubs/indian/metis.html>.
119. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 70 D.L.R.4th 385 (Can.) (activities integral to aboriginal survival
are included among the bundle of aboriginal rights).
120. Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 35.1; see also infra Part II.E (describing land claims
agreements generally).
121. R. v. Simon, [1985] 24 D.L.R.4th 390 (Can.) ("[Treaties and statutes dealing with
Indians should be given a fair, large and liberal construction and doubtful expressions resolved
in favour of the Indians, in the sense in which they would be naturally understood by the
Indians."); accord R. v. Nowegijick, [1983] 144 D.L.R.3d 193 (Can.). But c. R. v. Howard,
[1994] 2 S.C.R. 299 (Can.) (favorable treaty interpretation does not apply when the aborigines
in question are urbanized and educated, despite their ancestors' having been otherwise; here the
treaty had not been authorized and was not ratified by the Governor in Council). See also
Campbell, supra note 14, at 102 ("[The] tension between national sovereignty and Native
sovereignty is a continuing theme from the earliest benchmark cases... to current cases where
the extent of aboriginal rights and sovereignty are still at issue.").
122. Ontario v. Bear Island Found., [1991] 2 S.C.R. 570 (Can.) (band ceded aboriginal title
by adhesion, when there had been no discussion of adhesion or an adhesion document); Mitchell
v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85 (Can.) (intention of Parliament, not Indians, determines
treaty interpretation of aboriginal rights that were negotiated away).
123. R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 (Can.) (recognizing as a treaty, with associated
aboriginal rights, incomplete documents that were not ratified); R. v. White & Bob, [1966] 52
D.L.R.2d 481 (Can.) (same).
124. Patrick Macklem, Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples,
STAN. L. REv. 1311, 1320 (1993).
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advancement of aboriginal rights."z First Nations have had far more consistent
success through negotiations directly with the federal government and the
provinces."
2. The Indian Act
The Indian Act' regulates how the federal government interacts with
Indian and M6tis (but not Inuit)" aborigines, as well as how First Nations
may, if authorized, govem some internal matters." Enacted in 1876 by the
Canadian Parliament, its original sections were quite restrictive of aboriginal
rights." For example, provisions included the involuntary "enfranchisement"
of educated aborigines - meaning that Natives who went to college or obtained
professional degrees lost their Indian status. Parts of the original Indian Act also
allowed judges to void urbanized reserves, and limited the due process rights of
bands whose reserves were taken for public use.3' In recent decades the
Indian Act's strictures have been loosened, in several waves of reform.'
Looking at aboriginal self-determination specifically, however, the Act still
contains several interesting sections.
The Indian Act gives the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development broad regulatory powers over aboriginal bands: "fur-bearing
animals, fish and other game on reserves," "the destruction of noxious weeds
and the prevention of. .. insects, pests or diseases," transportation, livestock
protection, "pool rooms, dance halls, and other places of amusement," "to...
control the spread of diseases," medical services generally, "compulsory
hospitalization," housing inspection, overcrowding prevention, "sanitary
conditions," and "construction and maintenance of boundary fences."'3 The
Minister may also force band expenditure for items such as infrastructure
maintenance."j ' Band councils are given authority to make bylaws covering
similar (but not identical) areas, 35 although such bylaws must be "not
125. Campbell, supra note 14, at 110 (noting the Canadian Supreme Court's "unwillingness
to grapple with self-government"); Morse, supra note 8, at 678.
126. See Morse, supra note 8, at 673, 676-77; see also infra Part II.D.
127. Indian Act, R.S.C. ch. 1-5 (1985) (Can.); id. ch. 17 (1990) (Can.).
128. Id § 4(1).
129. INAC, The Canadian Indians (visited Nov. 22, 1996) <http:llwww.inac.gc.calpubs/
indian/1951.html> [hereinafter INAC, Canadian Indians: 1951.htrnl].
130. Bill Henderson, Henderson's Annotated Indian Act (visited Oct. 31, 1996) <http://
www.bloorstreet.comt200block/sindact.htm>, at 1-2 of 73 [hereinafter Henderson, Indian Act].
131. Id
132. Revisions to the Indian Act began in 1951. Id.; INAC, Canadian Indians: 1951.html,
supra note 129. For example, the enfranchisement provisions, see supra text accompanying note
131, were removed, and previously enfranchised Indians were restored to their previous status.
Bill Henderson, Indian Act, supra note 130, at 2 of 73.
133. Indian Act, supra note 127, § 73(1).
134. Id. § 34(1).




inconsistent with" the Indian Act or ministerial regulation.'" The Minister also
has power of disallowance over bylaws,'37 and the act's regulations control the
form of, and election to, band councils.' The supremacy of provincial laws
over each province's First Nations and their members is written into the act, 39
while the problem of provincial veto over reserve establishment is codified as
well.' 4'
Such restrictions shackle First Nations' attempts to exercise internal
sovereignty and self-determination. The Indian Act inadequately deals with
questions of legitimacy of governance and popular consent to that governance,
from the aboriginal perspective.'4 ' Through its grants of oversight to
governmental ministers, "Canada [has] denied the legal existence of First
Nations' sovereignty independent of delegated authority. Conceptually, any
power enjoyed by First Nations to pass laws and exercise jurisdiction over their
internal affairs was viewed by Canadian law as a delegation or grant of
authority from the Canadian state."'4
3. The Federal Policy Guide: Aboriginal Self-Government
The current government has also addressed aboriginal self-government in its
Federal Policy Guide: Aboriginal Self-Government (Policy Guide). That
document makes supportive statements towards aboriginal sovereignty, yet at the
same time points to some of the restrictions on native sovereignty inherent in
any federal system. Although in its introduction the government "recognizes the
inherent right of self-government as an existing right within Section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982,"'"4 the first part of the Policy Guide places a strong
136. Id. § 82(2).
137. Id. § 82(l).
138. Id. §§ 74-80; see also Wiessner, supra note 64, at 572 n.27 (noting similar external,
federal government restrictions on potential aboriginal self-determination in the United States:
"So far as an Indian tribe exists as a legal unit, it is by virtue of the domestic law within whose
territory the tribe occupies the land, and so far only as that law recognizes it.").
139. Indian Act, supra note 127, § 88. This provincial power stands in notable contrast to
the powers of states over Indian tribes in the United States. See infra Part III.B.
140. Id. § 37(1). Note that some provinces have begun to work more closely with their First
Nations, even to the point of recognizing their right to self-government. Ontario and First
Nations Discuss Aboriginal Constitutional Change, CAN. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 15, 1992; Ken
MacQueen, Capturing a Dream, MACLEAN'S, Dec. 9, 1985, at 12 (noting "bold experiment[s] in
native self-government" in British Columbia and Ontario).
141. Youngblood Henderson, supra note 63, at 245 ("Without a balance between Aboriginal
perspectives and the Eurocentric view, existing federalism reflects political domination and
oppression."). But see Morse, supra note 8, at 677 (stating that the Indian Act "is often not
followed in practice").
142. Macklem, supra note 124, at 1320.
143. INAC, Federal Policy Guide: Aboriginal Self-Government (visited Oct. 31, 1996)
<http://www.inac. gc.ca/pubs/selfgov/policy.html>, at 3 of 14 [hereinafter INAC, Federal Policy
Guide]; see infra text at notes 114-19 for a discussion of § 35 and the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms generally.
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qualification on this right:
The inherent right of self-government does not include a right of
sovereignty in the international law sense, and will not result in
sovereign independent Aboriginal nation states. On the contrary,
implementation of self-government should enhance the participation
of Aboriginal peoples in the Canadian federation, and ensure that
Aboriginal peoples and their governments do not exist in isolation,
separate and apart from the rest of Canadian society."
Later the Policy Guide further reduces the flexibility available to First
Nations, stating that "exercising the inherent right of self-government will
operate within the framework of the Canadian Constitution.... in harmony with
jurisdictions that are exercised by other governments."'"9 Thus, within the
Canadian federation the exercise of aboriginal self-government rights does not
mean that the First Nations are free of federal, or even provincial, constraints:
As a right which is exercised within the framework of the
Canadian Constitution, the inherent right will not lead to the
automatic exclusion of federal and provincial laws, many of which
will continue to apply to Aboriginal peoples or will co-exist
alongside validly enacted Aboriginal laws.
... Government believes that all agreements, including treaties,
should establish rules of priority by which such conflicts can be
resolved.... [N]egotiated rules of priority may provide for the
paramountcy of Aboriginal laws, but may not deviate from the
basic principle that those federal and provincial laws of overriding
national or provincial importance will prevail over conflicting
Aboriginal laws."
UltimLtely the subject matters listed in the Policy Guide as open to
negotiation for First Nation control under self-government agreements 47 are
quite restricted, and read like the powers of a municipality - health, education,
housing, transportation, policing, zoning, resource management, taxation, etc.
Provincial-level powers, such as marriage and divorce laws, environmental
protection, the penal system, and labor issues, are specifically exempted from
aboriginal oversight, as are federal-level issues such as international relations,
defense, economic policy, communications, emergency powers, etc. 49
144. INAC, Federal Policy Guide, supra note 143, at 4 of 14.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 7 of 14.
147. See, e.g., Yukon First Nations Self-Government Act ch. 35 (1994).
148. INAC, Federal Policy Guide, supra note 143, at 4 of 14; cf supra notes 133, 135
(discussion the powers of the federal government and aboriginal bands under the Indian Act);
infra notes 269-72 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. Indian Reorganization Act).




A federal commission looked specifically at the question of aboriginal self-
government in 1983. That commission issued 58 recommendations for creating
a new relationship between the Canadian government and the First Nations,
adding that "an essential element of this relationship must be Indian self-
government.""a Closely linked to effective self-government was Native control
of a strong economic base."' Yet just as the discussions of the Indian Act
showed,'" government limits on sovereignty and self-determination operate to
restrict the exercise of that right even before First Nations can enter into
negotiations for the power to exercise it. In doing so the Indian Act and the
Policy Guide limit the utility of sections 25 and 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982, skirting the constitutional protections by defining certain powers and
activities as being beyond the scope of aboriginal authority.
4. Land Claims Agreements
The Policy Guide opens with a preface by the ministers in charge of
aboriginal affairs, in which they state that "[the objective of the federal
government is clear. Significant change must be made to ensure Aboriginal
peoples have greater control over their lives. The most just, reasonable and
practical mechanism to achieve this is through negotiated agreements.""In
Today these land claims agreements, rather than formal treaties, are the most
common form of Canadian government/First Nation interaction at the federal
level." The first land claims agreement was reached with the James Bay Cree
and the Northern Qudbec Inuit in 1975."55 This agreement grew out of protests
by the northern Quebec aborigines over the province's plans to develop the
massive hydroelectric potential of the region.'" Signatories to the James Bay
negotiated solution to the Inuit self-determination claims, which was the creation of a territory
on an equal footing (including legislative powers) with existing territories. See infra Part II.E.
150. INAC, The Canadian Indians (visited Nov. 22, 1996) <http://www.inac.gc.ca/pubs/
indianlself.html> [hereinafter INAC, Canadian Indians: self.html]; see also Howard Schneider,
It Put Off Treaty, So British Columbia's Up for Grabs, VASH. PosT, Aug. 21, 1996, at A01
(noting the recent release of a 4000 page Canadian government study on aboriginal relations with
the federal government).
151. INAC, Canadian Indians: self.html, supra note 150. Thus a bureaucratic process
achieved in principle results similar to those achieved in fact through negotiations with the Cree
and Inuit over the proposed HydroQubec Project several years earlier. See infra Part II.D.
152. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
153. INAC, Federal Policy Guide, supra note 143, at 1 of 14. This position builds on an
earlier government document entitled In All Fairness: A Native Claims Policy, Comprehensive
Claims that was issued in 1981. Kersey, supra note 55, at 436.
154. See also infra Part III.C (describing U.S. land claims settlement legislation).
155. Henderson, Aboriginal Law, supra note 11, at 7 of 19.
156. HydroQubec Environnement et Collectivitds, The Inuit (visited Oct. 2, 1996) <http'J/
envir.hydro.qc.calcolllmgen0la.html>. The Crees began challenging Qubec's hydroelectric
development plans through judicial action, winning an important decision in 1973 that was based
on the Qu6bec Boundary Extension Act of 1912 (see supra note 106). INAC, The Canadian
Indians (visited Nov. 22, 1996) <http'J/www.inac.gc.ca/pubs/imdian/agree.htmbl>. See generally
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and Northern Qu6bec Agreement included the provincial and federal
governments, the Grand Council of the Cree of Quebec, the Northern Qudbec
Inuit Association, and three provincially chartered energy corporations. The
agreement covers a total of 1,066,000 square kilometers,'" an area equal to
roughly one-ninth of Canada's entire land area, and over three-fourths of
Qu6bec.' Six subsequent agreements have dealt with localized issues such as
water levels and environmental remediation.1"
Althcugh it has not solved many of the First Nations' problems vis a vis the
HydroQu6bec Project,"6 the James Bay and Northern Qu6bec Agreement has
proved a popular model for First Nations seeking to reach agreements with
provincial and federal officials over Native rights to resources and settling of
aboriginal title issues. In the last twenty years ten major land claims agreements
have seffled aboriginal title to an additional 560,000 square kilometers of
land.'
61
D. The inuit and the Arctic Region
The Inuit are not only treated differently under Canadian law, as compared
Arctic Circle: The Crees of Northern Quibec (visited Oct. 2, 1996) <http:llwww.lib.ucon.ecul
ArcticCircle/HistoryCulture/Cree> (providing links to 16 other sources of information on the Cree,
the land claims agreement, and the northern Qudbec region).
157. James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, § 2, art. 2.1; The Inuit, supra note 156.
Under the original agreement, the Crees, numbering approximately 12,000, received C$169
million, clear title to 14,025 square kilometers of land, resource rights to an additional 966,575
square kilometers, and some control over their internal development, including education and
health services, in exchange for their surrender of their aboriginal title of the lands to Quebec and
Canada. The Inuit, numbering approximately 7000, received C$94 million, clear title to 8106
square kilometers, resource rights to an additional 978,247 square kilometers (896,650 of that
shared with the Crees), as well as similar controls over their internal development, in exchange
for surrender of their aboriginal title. James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, § 2, art. 2.1.
The jointly administered land area is comparable in size of the Province of Alberta. The Inuit,
supra note 156.
158. Statistics Canada, Canadian Dimensions - Land and Freshwater Area (visited Oct. 2,
1996) <http: vrvw.statcan/caldocumentslenglish/pgdb/land/geography/phys0l.htm>.
159. HydroQuebec Environnement et Collectivites, The Crees (visited Oct. 2, 1996) <http:l/
envir.hydrol.qc.calcollcrgen06a.html>.
160. Robert R. Rodgers, Power from the North: A Case Study of New York State's
Regulatoty Process for the Importation of Electricity from Quebec, 6 GEO. INr'L ENVTL. L. REV.
683,692-93 (1994) (discussing Cree social breakdown, environmental contamination, and ongoing
litigation). See also Campbell, supra note 14, at 111 (arguing that the agreement is "more a
statement of the rights of the James Bay hydro project than it is of the rights" of the Cree and
Inuit.).
161. Morse, supra note 8, at 682. A recent example of this form of agreement between
aboriginal bands and the federal government addresses the concerns of the Nisga'a in British
Columbia. The Nisgaa received a settlement of C$140 million for their claim to lands that now
make up downtown Vancouver, other bands await negotiations over similar and larger claims.
Schneider, supra note 150; see also Justice Canada, Gwich'in Land Claim Settlement Act, c.53
(1992) (visited Dec. 12, 1996) <http://canada.justice.gc.ca/folio>.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss2/6
COMMENT
to other aboriginal groups, but also are ethnically distinct. They are closely
related to Arctic coastal people around the Arctic Ocean, living in what most
would consider a cold and unforgiving climate"a in an isolated, barren
area." Approximately 41% of the Northwest Territories' (NWT) residents
speak a language other than French or English - presumably the Inuit language
of Inuktituk. The figure rises to almost 75% in the eastern part of the NWT-
the future Territory of Nunavut.'"
The Inuit led a migratory hunting life, and even after Canada began asserting
its sovereignty over the area in the early part of the twentieth century, the Inuit
remained culturally isolated for several decades." However, the combination
of Cold War defense needs and the discovery of valuable minerals increased
southern attention on the Inuit's land." The federal government resettled the
Inuit into permanent villages, opened a school system (English language only
until the 1960s), and established a bureaucratic structure administered largely by
outsiders.'6" Increasing education and communication with the outside world
led to the Inuit realization of their disparate treatment, as compared to the First
Nations further south, and to greater Inuit participation in municipal
governments that the federal government had established."6
When the federal government announced that it would be willing to negotiate
land claims settlement agreements with aboriginal groups in 1973, the Inuit soon
organized a formal response. Early on the Inuit requests included the creation
of an Inuit-run territory, and this was a major stumbling block until 1982.'"
In that year the NWT held a plebiscite, authorized by the territorial legislature,
on whether the territory should be split as the Inuit proposed. A total of 57%
of the territory's residents voted "yes"; within the proposed new territory, named
"Nunavut,' 70 the "yes" votes were over 80%.' With the results in hand, the
Inuit position was strengthened and, while continuing negotiations over the exact
162. See Kersey, supra note 55, at 432 (noting "their location in the climatically and
geographically inhospitable North").
163. A total of 80% of Nunavut's residents will live north of the treeline. Mulroney HaiL
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, REUrERs FIN. SERV., May 25, 1993.
164. Statistics Canada, Nunavut/Western NWT Fact Sheet (visited Jan. 16, 1997) <http'J/
www.stats.gov.ca/Bureau/Statlnfo/NunavutWest/FactSheet.html>, at 3 of 6 [hereinafter
Nunavut/Western NWT Fact Sheet].
165. Kersey, supra note 55, at 432.
166. See, e.g., Norman Chance, In Pursuit of Progress: A Colonial Narrative (visited May
4, 1997) <http://www.lib. uconn.edu/ArcticCircle/HistoryCultureprogress.html>; Peter Gizewski,
Military Activity and Environmental Security: The Case of Radioactivity in the Arctic (visited
May 04, 1997) <http.//www.carc.org/pubs/v21no4/military.htm>.
167. Kersey, supra note 55, at 432-33.
168. Id at 434.
169. Id at 435-37.
170. "Nunavut" means "our land" in Inuktituk. Id. at 436.
171. Id. at 437-38.
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wording of the land claims agreement and territorial act took another decade, the
Inuit eventually achieved their goal."
E. The Territory of Nunavut
In 1993 the Inuit of the NWT and the Canadian federal government agreed
to the most comprehensive land claims agreement ever reached in Canada.'"
Two acts, the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) and the Nunavut Act,
were signed by the Prime Minister on May 25, 1993, and passed by the
Canadian Parliament the following month.'74 The agreements were the product
of over a decade of negotiations, dating back to before the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms constitutionalized the protections afforded aboriginal rights.'"
1. The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement
The NLCA'76 settled aboriginal title to a large percentage of Canadian
territory - the Inuit received title to a minimum of 352,191 square kilome-
ters,'" or almost 4% of Canada." The Inuit title is exclusive and alienable,
subject only to certain public access easements'" and certain government
activities." Federal, territorial, and local laws apply to this land as they would
to any privately held land.'"' Thus the Inuit's title is distinguishable from the
aboriginal title, held in trust by the Crown, that characterizes First Nation
reserves in the prairie provinces and elsewhere.'" In addition, Inuit
corporations and the people themselves received a strong say in how several
hundred thousand additional square kilometers are managed, over C$1.1 billion
172. Id. at 437-41. One major sticking point during this period came not from the federal
government but from a separate aboriginal negotiating team representing the Dene and Mdtis
people, who disagreed on where the boundary lines of the territory and the Inuit lands should be
drawn. Id. at 438-40.
173. Because it is not a province, the NWT was not entitled to participate in the negotiations
at the same level that, for example, Qudbec participated in the James Bay and Northern Qudbec
Agreement.
174. Canadian Financial Report, REUTERs FIN. SERV., May 25, 1993, BC cycle; see also
Redrawing the Map, MACLEAN's, Dec. 30, 1991, at 9 (detailing the proposed land claims
agreement and territorial secession); Brian Bergman, A Test of Wills, MACLEAN'S, May 4, 1992,
at 20 (same).
175. Kersey, supra note 55, at 436-37; see also Nunavut Implementation Committee (NIC),
Footprints in New Snow, ch. 1, at 2 of 8 (visited Sept. 19, 1996) <http.//www.nunanet.com/-nic/
footprints0l.html> [hereinafter NIC, Footprints in New Snow].
176. Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, ch. 19 (1993) (Can.) [hereinafter NLCAI.
177. Id. scheds. 19-2 to -7.
178. Nunavut/Western NWT Fact Sheet, supra note 164, at 1 of 6. In comparison, the Inuit
make up less than one-tenth of one percent of Canada's population. Id.
179. NLCA, supra note 176, scheds. 21-1 to -3.
180. Id. sched. 21-4.
181. Id. § 2.12.1. The NLCA prevails over any conflicting federal, territorial, or local law,
however. Id. § 2.12.2.




in capital transfer payments, and additional shares of royalties from resource
development on federally owned lands."s
In exchange the Inuit agreed to
(a) cede, release and surrender to Her Majesty The Queen in
Right of Canada, all their aboriginal claims, rights, title and
interests, if any, in and to lands and waters anywhere within Canada
and adjacent offshore areas within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of
Canada; and
(b) agree, on their behalf,... not to assert any cause of
action ... or demand of whatever kind or nature which they ever
had, now have or may hereafter have against Her Majesty ... or
any province, the government of any territory or any person based
on any aboriginal claims, rights, title or interests in and to lands and
waters described in Sub-section (a).18
This sweeping language is somewhat offset two paragraphs later, when the
document states that
[n]othing in the Agreement shall:
(a) be construed so as to deny that Inuit are an aboriginal people
of Canada or, subject to Section 2.7.1, affect their ability to
participate in or benefit from any existing or future constitutional
rights for aboriginal people which may be applicable to them;
(b) affect the ability of Inuit to participate in and benefit from
government programs for Inuit or aboriginal people generally ....
(c) affect the rights of Inuit as Canadian citizens .... ."
Suits based on the failure of the Canadian government to follow through with
its promises in the NLCA are also excepted from the general immunity
described above." The NLCA also does not affect the rights of other
Canadian aboriginal populations in the same area, or the ability of the Inuit to
negotiate separate agreements with such peoples."n
The NLCA established the Nunavut Planning Commission (NPC) to oversee
the implementation of the agreement. At least half of the NPC must be residents
of the lands covered by the NLCA.'" NPC "establish[es] broad planning
183. Kersey, supra note 55, at 449; INAC, Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (visited Oct.
31, 1996) <http://www.inac.gc.ca/pubslnunavutlindex.html>; see also Nunavut Planning
Commission, Nunavut Land Claim (visited Oct. 2, 1996) <http://npe.nunavut.ca/general
claim.html> (summarizing the Agreement); Mary Williams Walsh, Next Step: Canada's Inuit
Reclaiming Ancestral Land, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1992, at 1 (same).
184. NLCA, supra note 176, § 2.7.1.
185. Id. § 2.7.3.
186. Id. § 2.15.4.
187. U art. 40.
188. lId § 11.4.7.
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
policies, objectives and goals... in conjunction with [the federal] Government"
and "develop[s]... land use plans" to "fulfill the objectives of the
Agreement."'" To meet this objective the lands are divided by character-
istics -- possessing renewable resources, nonrenewable resources, "commercial
value," or "archaeological, historical or cultural importance" - and thenceforth
are to be managed to provide a "mix" of these characteristics." The NPC also
must 'identify and prioritize" hazardous waste sites in the Inuit lands in
conjunction with its general land use planning activities."' In conjunction with
other sections of the NLCA,'" this requirement could serve to restrict Inuit
uses of their lands. Presumably, however, these restrictions were agreed upon
during negotiations; indeed the NLCA states that the "primary purpose" of the
lands is "to provide Inuit with rights in land that promote economic self-
sufficiency of Inuit through time, in a manner consistent with Inuit social and
cultural needs and aspirations.""' In addition, the Inuit were able to choose the
parcels to which they could retain mineral rights - in the end choosing 139




Also ameliorating the review requirements embedded in the NLCA are
certain "affirmative action"-like requirements. By 1996, all government
organizations affected by the NLCA were to have prepared an "Inuit
employment plan" to employ Inuit in government "at a representative level."
1"'
The NLCA defines this as "reflecting the ratio of Inuit to the total population
of the Nunavut Settlement Area [the area covered by the NLCA]."'"
Determining who qualifies as an Inuit for these purposes, or any purpose under
the NLCA, is left largely to the Inuit themselves, through a process set out in
the N.LCA ' - quite a different situation from the ministerial control over
First Nations' membership under the Indian Act. 9'
Additional agencies were created by the NLCA to oversee specific actions
or resource bases in the region. One example is the "Nunavut Impact Review
Board," a government agency responsible for assessing the environmental and
socioeconomic impacts of proposed projects on the Inuit lands."w This
189. Id. § 11.4.1.
190. Id. §§ 17.1.2-.3.
191. Id. § 11.9.1.
192. The NLCA explicitly lists the land use planning principles and policies to be followed
for these lands. Id. § 11.2.
193. Id § 17.1.1; see also Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. [hereinafter NTI], Nunavut Lands (visited
Jan. 16, 1997) <http:llwww.lib.uconn.edulArcticCirclelSEFJnunavutmanage.html> (NTI holds
subsurface rights to Inuit-titled lands).
194. Kersey, supra note 55, at 449 (stating that the parcels contain over 80% of the
territory's known copper, diamonds, gold, lead, silver, and zinc).
195. NLCA, supra note 176, § 23.4.1.
196. id. arts. 4, 23.
197. Id. art. 35.
1911. See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.




includes recommending the establishment of a more formal environmental
assessment panel under Canada's Minister of the Environment and exposing the
proposed development to the strictures of the federal regulatory process' -
again, however, a process that would have to be met for comparable privately
held land.
2. The Nunavut Act
The Nunavut Acts' goes even further than the NLCA in recognizing the
Inuit claims, literally redrawing the map in granting constitutional recognition
to aboriginal self-determination. On April 1, 1999, the NWT will be split in
two, and a new territory, named Nunavut, will be created.' Nunavut will
consist of a large section of mainland North America, and will also include
almost the entire Canadian Arctic archipelago of islands west of Greenland
(Kalaallit Nunaat), and all of the islands within Hudson Bay and James Bay -
an area one-sixth that of the entire country of Canada. Rather than establishing
an autonomous region within (or on top of) existing provincial or territorial
boundaries, the Nunavut Territorial Government will have the same rights,
responsibilities, and duties as the Government of the Yukon Territory and the
Government of the NWT.'n
the Nunavut Water Board and the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board).
200. NLCA, supra note 176, § 12.6.2.
201. Nunavut Act, ch. 28 (1993) (Can.).
202. NIC, Footprints in New Snow, supra note 175, at ch. 1(a). Inuit negotiations began at
the same time that the Cree and Inuit in Quebec were negotiating the James Bay and Northern
Qudbec Agreement, but stalled over Inuit concern over local representation on the negotiating
committee. Kersey, supra note 55, at 436.
203. Given the distinctive nature of the Territory of Nunavut in relation to previous self-
government and land claims agreements, the creation of the Province of Manitoba can provide
a useful lesson for both the reader and the Inuit in the future. The Manitoba Act created the first
new province after confederation in 1867, in response to strong, and sometimes violent, protests
by the Mdtis in the prairie region. In the 1860s the Mdtis had aggressively resisted the influx of
pioneers from the east, seizing a Hudson's Bay Company post. They sought from the federal
government the protection of their aboriginal rights, including property rights, and the creation
of "a government similar to that of the other Canadian provinces." TLE, A Debt To Be Paid Ch.
1, supra note 63, at 2 of 2.
The Manitoba Act spends most of its 36 sections on the establishment and powers of the new
provincial government. The Act makes no direct statement about why the province was created,
although § 31 states that it is "expedient, towards the extinguishment of Indian title to the lands
in the Province," to appropriate 1,400,000 acres of land to M~tis families. Manitoba Act § 31.
The power to select these lands lay with the federal government, however, not the Mrtis
themselves. Id. §§ 32(1)-(4). The Mrtis problem was not settled by the passage of the Act.
Violence continued against settlers, in response to unsettled land claims; continued inaction in
Ottawa lead to still more outbreaks of turmoil. Eight thousand federal troops were sent to the
province, the Mdis leaders were arrested, and their organization was dismembered. INAC, The
Canadian Indians (visited Nov. 22, 1996) <http://www.inac.gc.calpubs/indianl reb.html>; Louis
Riel Metis Council, Louis Riel Metis Council Homepage (visited Dec. 15, 1996) <http://
www.paranoia.com-irielsoc>. Today, the Metis and First Nations peoples make up a small part
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As with other acts creating provinces or territories, the Nunavut Act
focuses on the structure and powers of the territorial government.' The
territorial government's powers include both municipal-type functions identified
in the Indian Act and provincial-level powers such as control over voting
regulations, taxation, marriage, incorporations, and a justice system (including
defining property rights, imposing fines and sentences, and managing
prisons). All these closely parallel the legislative powers provision in the
Northwest Territories Act, which created the NWT.' A more unique
provision of the Nunavut Act allows the territorial government to "preserv[e],
use and promot[e] the Inuktitut language," so long as the government does not
interfere with the status or rights of English and French speakers."z Regarding
the rights of other aborigines, the territorial government may not "restrict or
prohibit" hunting rightsa while it may enact laws to implement the NLCA,
as well as other land claims agreements with other aboriginal peoples if the
federal government should so designate!"°
Advising and guiding the creation of the territory's government is the
Nunavut Implementation Commission (NIC), a body established by the Nunavut
Act itself.2" The nine-member NIC is charged with advising the signatories
to the Nunavut Act. When Nunavut comes into being in 1999, the NWT's laws
will initially carryover into the new territory, and will continue to apply until the
Nunavut legislative assembly can revisit the code that it inherits."' NIC has
produA- a document outlining the territorial creation process, 13 and has issued
proposals on the makeup of the territory's legislative assembly,"' including an
unusual proposal to require that each electoral district elect one man and one
of the population and land area of Manitoba. Statistics Canada, Canadian Dimensions- Selected
Ethnic Origins (visited Mar. 30, 1997) <http:llwww.statcan.calenglishlpgdb/people/
population/demo28c.htm> (people classified as Mdtis or "Indian" total 73,975, out of a total
provincial population of 669,405). The influx of white settlers overwhelmed any potential that
existed for the Mdtis to form their "own" province. See also supra notes 111-13 and
accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 105, 203.
205. Nunavut Act, ch. 28 pt. 1, §§ 13-17 (1993) (Can.); cf inter alia Manitoba Act §§ 32(1)-
(4).
206. Id. pt. 1, § 23(1)(a)-(x); see also id. pt. 1, §§ 31-36 (detailing the scope and powers of
the territory's judiciary).
207. See also NIC, Footprints in New Snow, supra note 175, ch.1, at 3 of 8.
208. Nunavut Act, ch. 28, pt. 1, § 23(0)(n) (1993) (Can.).
209. Id. pt. 1, § 24.
210. Id. pt. 1, § 25.
211. Id. pt. 3, §§ 54-58.
212. Id. pt. 4; NIC, Footprints in New Snow, supra note 175, app. 7, at 3 of 10; see also
NTI, supra note 193, at 2 of 3 (land use planning "rules and procedures are closely modeled on
the existing regime in the NWT").
213. The index to this document can be found at NIC, Footprints in New Snow (visited Sept.
19, 1996) <http://www.nunanet.com-niclfootprintsindex.html>.
214. NIC, Footprints in New Snow, supra note 175, ch. 4, at 3-4, 6 of 7.
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woman.2 5 In this process NIC endeavored to meld modem parliamentary
systems to traditional Inuit societal ideas about governance and decision
making! 6 This has extended even to recommendations about the design of the
territorial government's office and administrative buildings 7
The Nunavut Act was not enacted, nor will the Territory of Nunavut be
established, to provide explicitly for aboriginal self-determination 18 NIC itself
states that the new government will "not [be] a form of ethnic self-
government 21 9 and that "the government of this new territory should be a
'public' one, that is, a government which would be answerable to a legislative
assembly elected by all citizens meeting residence and age qualifications and
whose activities would be subject to Constitutional and statutory guarantees
against discrimination."'
In practice, however, the creation of Nunavut will allow the Inuit a large
degree of self-determination - indeed perhaps the strongest such government
in North America since the Iroquois (Hodenosaunee) Confederacy was created
several centuries ago.' This stems in part from sheer numbers; the Inuit make
up 85% of Nunavut's population.m In addition, as noted supra the NLCA
provides for proportional representation of the Inuit in government
employment m The NPC recognizes that "[t]he Inuit... will therefore have
215. Id.
216. let app. 8, at 4-5 of 17.
217. Id. app. 7, at 9 of 10.
218. Nunavut is not an autonomous region comparable to neighboring Kalaallit Nunaat
(Greenland), a department of Denmark. Greenland operates under a Home Rule Government
established by Denmark in 1979. Governance of internal matters such as schools, welfare, and
taxes is managed by the Home Rule Government, while the Danes control defense and foreign
affairs. Greenland Tourism als, Greenland - A Modem Arctic Society Part 3 of 4 (visited Oct.
7, 1996) <http.//www.greenland-guide.dkgt/intro-03.html>. Despite this European-based control,
however, when Denmark joined the European Community (now the European Union), Greenland
successfully sought to be excepted from that action. In addition, Danish territory is considered
to be foreign for customs purposes. Greenland Tourism als, Greenland - A Modem Arctic Society
Part 4 of 4 (visited Oct. 7, 1996) <http'//www.greenland-guidedk/gt/intro-03.html>; see also
Franks, supra note 62, at 233 ("Denmark's Greenland, Kalaallit Nunaat,... represents a far less
paternalistic approach to native self-government than the historic approach of the United
States . . ").
219. NIC, Basic Information on the Work of the NIC (visited Sept. 19, 1996) <http:ll
www.nunanet.com/-nic/ nunavutfaq.html>.
220. NIC, Footprints in New Snow, supra note 175, at 2 of 8.
221. WEATHERFORD, supraz note 38, at 135 ("When the Europeans arrived in America, the
[Iroquois] league constituted the most extensive and important political unit north of the Aztec
civilization.").
222. NunavutlWestern NWT Fact Sheet, supra note 164. This compares to a figure of 37%
for the NWT as a whole. Virtually 100% of Nunavut's aboriginal population is Inuit, while for
the NWT the Inuit make up just over 60% of the territory's aboriginal population (the remainder
being classified as "North American Indian" and "Mtis"). Id.
223. NLCA, supra note 176, art. 23.2.1 (stating that "[t]he objective of this Article is to
increase Inuit participation in government employment . . . to a representative level.").
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a preponderant influence in a public government to be elected by all residents
of Nunavtt, Inuit and non-Inuit."'
In summation, the Nunavut Act and the NLCA provide the "high water
mark" for the aboriginal right of self-determination in Canada. In particular,
land claims agreements stand in contrast to their earlier counterparts that
faltered, such as the Numbered Treaties and the Manitoba Act.m At one
extreme, reserves have not been successful because they have kept title to the
land in the Crown, and placed even First Nations with reserved land under both
federal and provincial control. On the other hand, the Manitoba Act, by creating
a province like any other, precluded First Nations' ability to address its own
unique concerns. By creating a new jurisdiction of a status equal to its sibling
territories, the Nunavut model works well for the concerns of the Inuit within
the Canadian system - a federalism marked by a relatively weak central
government, powerful provinces, and intermittent threats of schism along
regional and ethnic lines. 6 Because Nunavut will be a distinct territory, it will
operate under the direct oversight of Parliament and the strictures and
obligations of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Inuit in Nunavut, how-
ever, will now be free of the intermediate layer of "outsider" government
represented by the NWT. Hopefully, because of the constitutionalization of this
arrangement, in conjunction with the rights embodied in the NLCA, and its Inuit
employment quotas (as well as geography and climate),' the Inuit of Nunavut
will not face the same power dilution problems that handicapped the M6tis
under the Manitoba Act.
III. United States Aboriginal Policies
The historical pattern of United States/aboriginal contact largely parallels the
Canadian experience. The two chief differences have been the greater reliance
on federal legislation in the United States, rather than treaties and provincial- or
state-level legislation, and the different timing of the various types of
"Representative level" is defined as the ratio of Inuit to the total Nunavut population. NIC,
Footprints in New Snow, supra note 175, ch. 1(b).
224. Nunavut Planning Commission, Nunavut Government (visited Oct. 2, 1996) <http:ll
npc.nunaviit.caleng/nunavut/govem.html>; cf. Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 437 (noting,
in reference to U.S. tribes whose government took the form of state-chartered municipalities that
"the growth of the non-Indian population in the municipality jeopardizes the control of the
governmer.t.... It is therefore entirely possible that the non-Indian population might exceed the
Indian population, thereby placing municipal control in the hands of non-Indians"); see infra notes
250-59 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 203.
226. S'ee Catherine Valcke, Quibec Civil Law and Canadian Federalism, 21 YALE J. INVI,
L. 67, 69 (1996); Allen Buchanan, Federalism, Secession, and the Morality of Inclusion, 37 ARIZ.
L. REV. 53, 59 (1995).
227. Swee NIC, Footprints in New Snow, supra note 175, ch. I, at 6 of 8 (referencing the
"obvious reasons of climate and ecology" as to why the Arctic region was not "homesteaded").
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss2/6
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federal/tribal interactions. For example, the U.S. treaty-making process started
from the same precedents as Canada's and similarly aimed to secure title to
lands already under U.S. jurisdiction and thereby allow for settlement., The
U.S. process took place much earlier, however, beginning with the
Revolutionary War period itself and ending by congressional fiat in 1871' -
just as the Canadian federal treaty process was hitting its stride. Since that time
U.S. federal jurisdiction over aboriginal sovereignty has focused on legislation
and Congress, rather than direct negotiation and judicial interpretation of treaty-
based rights. Nevertheless the judiciary provides an important role through
interpreting the Constitution and Congress's power over tribal governments and
tribal members.
A. The Judiciary
A triad of early U.S. Supreme Court decisions provided a foundation for the
federal legislation that has marked U.S. federal/aboriginal relations, as well as
later judicial decisions. In the first, Johnson v. M'Intosh, ' Chief Justice
Marshall used the "discovery doctrine" to uphold not only British (and therefore
American) sovereignty over, but also underlying title to, American lands. What
exactly this meant for the original, aboriginal rights was unclear, though
Marshall stated that "the rights of the original inhabitants were... necessarily
impaired" by this doctrine.' "IT]he exclusive power to extinguish that
[aboriginal title] [is] vested in that government which might constitutionally
exercise it."'
Nine years later Marshall ameliorated M'Intosh's sweeping conclusions in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. 3 It was here Marshall developed the famous
notion of tribes as "domestic dependent nations," characterizing Indians as
"wards" of the United States. A year later in Worcester v. Georgia,5
Marshall went even further in reversing the discovery doctrine's impact, stating
that it was inconceivable that "th; inhabitants of either quarter of the globe
could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other,
or over the lands they occupied . . . ."' In doing so Marshall confirmed that
the tribes were sovereign and that the states had at best limited authority over
tribes and tribal members.
228. Campbell, supra note 14, at 103.
229. Id. at 104 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1994)).
230. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
231. Id. at 574. Note the similarity of reasoning to that employed later by the Canadian court
in St. Catherine's Milling, supra text accompanying note 108.
232. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 585.
233. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
234. Id. at 17.
235. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
236. Id. at 543.
237. Id. at 553-54.
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Noted Indian law scholar Felix Cohen summed up the Supreme Court's early
jurisprudence on tribes with three points: (1) tribes possess all the powers of a
sovereign state; (2) conquest has terminated tribes' external sovereignty and
rendered their internal sovereignty subject to Congress; and (3) absent
congressional or treaty qualifications to the contrary, tribes continue to possess
all attributes of internal sovereignty.' David Getches describes the Court as
the "conscience" of federal Indian law, "protecting tribal powers and rights at
least against state action, unless and until Congress clearly states a contrary
intention."'
B. The States
While the Constitution assigns Congress great authority to regulate commerce
"with the Indian tribes,"'  and hence to regulate Native Americans as
individuals, it neither gives to nor recognizes in states any power over Indians
within their borders. Because of this, there are implicit restrictions on what state
legislation applies to Native Americans and tribal governments; for example,
states are quite restricted in their ability to impose taxes (even nonspecific taxes)
on Native Americans2 ' and especially on tribal governments.m (Note that
this is quite different than the powers of Canadian provinces over First Nations
and Mttis within their jurisdiction.) Nevertheless over the years states have been
increasingly able to extend their powers into Indian-related affairs, 3 often by
chipping away at the definition of "Indian Country" and tribal lands. w As
reservations have experienced development on their borders (and increasing
numbers of non-Indian residents and businesses inside), they have become
"jurisdictional vacuums" that states have attempted - increasingly success-
238. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 123 (Univ. of N.M. photo.
reprint 1970) (1942).
239. Getches, supra note 24, at 1573-74. See generally id. at 1589-93 (describing Supreme
Court jurisprudence).
240. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, ci. 3.
241. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
242. Getches, supra note 24, at 1585.
243. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (tribe could not regulate or
exclude non-Indians from hunting on non-trust reservation lands); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676
(1990) (tribal court had no criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indian).
244. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Shrinking Indian Country: A State Offensive to Divest
Tribal Sovereignty, 27 CONN. L. REv. 1281, 1282 (1995). See generally Judith V. Royster &
Rory Snowarrow Fausett, Control of the Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal
Delegation, and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REV. 581 (1989); Royster &
Snowarrow Fausett, Fresh Pursuit, supra note 33. Some states go even further in attempts to
reduce aboriginal sovereignty. See Valencia-Weber, supra, at 1300 ("The policy of the State of
Alaska is that Alaska is one country, one people. The State of Alaska opposes expansion of tribal
governmental powers and the creation of 'Indian Country' in Alaska.") (quoting Alaska Gov.




fully - to fill. 20 Indian rights advocates have criticized this development,
noting that administrative efficiency and certainty require tribes to be the sole
authority on reservations; "'[t]he only alternatives to this arrangement are
continued jurisdictional chaos on Indian reservations or tribal suicide."'"' In
addition states provide the majority of social services to tribal members,'l and
of course are the sole interactor with tribes that are not federally recognized.'
Not all state interaction with aboriginal populations has been to the detriment
of the latter, however. For example, the State of Maine has set aside two
nonvoting seats in its legislature for the Passamaquody and Penobscot Indians,
two tribes which control a large land base in the state but which are not
recognized by the federal government. 9 Another option for tribes, recognized
or nonrecognized, is incorporation as a municipality (city or township) within
a state. This is feasible in part because tribal governments exercise powers
comparable to municipalities.' Tribes organized as state municipalities date
back to 1870, when Massachusetts allowed the Mashpee to incorporate and
Connecticut did the same for the Gay Head Wampanoag.Y More recently
many tribal villages in Alaska were also state-chartered municipalities, while
settlement of the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot land claims in Maine involved
incorporations - as well as the dedicated legislature seats."
As state municipalities, the tribes can obtain all the funding, and exercise all
the powers, that inhere to any other state municipality.'n In addition, a
nonrecognized tribal government can retain a distinct and separate structure, to
allow for adequate representation of non-Indians in the municipal
government'z The downside is that, as with the M6tis experience in
ManitobapS there is a risk that the tribal members will be "swamped" by non-
Indian immigrants to the municipality; this is especially true if the tribe does not
have control over a land base, which would allow it some additional powers to
exclude or separate themselves from non-Indians. In addition these
municipal governments are also subject to all state laws (barring certain home
rule veto provisions applicable to municipalities generally); thus state
245. Getches, supra note 24, at 1589.
246. BORDE CH, supra note 9, at 107.
247. Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 454 (citing a figure of 80% to 85% of the
"government services received by Indians" as coming from state and local governments).
248. See supra note 8 and infra notes 250-60 (discussing tribes as state-chartered
municipalities).
249. Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 454.
250. See supra notes 133, 135, and 147-48 and accompanying text; Kahanu & Van Dyke,
supra note 7, at 435.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 435-36.
253. Id.
254. Cf. id at 436.
255. See supra note 203.
256. Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 436-37.
257. Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 VA. L.
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governments can have a more intrusive effect on tribes as municipalities than
they do on federally recognized tribal governments. Municipally based tribes
are not without any federal opportunity however, because many federal Indian
welfare programs utilize "Indian Country" or "Indian community" as their
operative nexus?' Several circuit courts of appeal have held that communities
noncontiguous with reservations, or even communities of nonrecognized tribes,
may qualify for such benefits and programs a
C. Congressional Actions
The converse of the states' limited power over Indian affairs, therefore, is a
sweeping power in Congress to affect the federal/Indian relationship and tribal
government powers. In the first century of the United States' existence, the
most common expression of this power was in the form of treaty making and
ratification, largely to secure title to lands and, as a related measure, move
individual tribes westward to accommodate "pioneer" expansion and settling of
"unoccupied" lands. The idea that the "Indian problem" could be solved by
separating the tribes from the advancing pioneers took strong hold in the public's
eye and government policy. It was one of the justifications underlying President
Jackson's infamous refusal to abide by the Court's decision in Worcester and
initiate the terrible "Trail of Tears" that followed, with the forced march of the
Cherokee west to Indian Territory (now Oklahoma).a These Indian removal
policies scarcely paused during the Civil War, and returned with a vengeance
in the infamous "Indian Wars" of the Great Plains.' As the Cavalry shoved
tribe after tribe onto reservations, often in places removed from traditional lands,
aborigines' ability to maintain a viable livelihood and continue important cultural
practices disappeared. This in turn initiated, and then increased, reliance on
the U.S. government as a source of both social welfare and governmental
authority.
REv. 1347, 1362-65 (1997).
258. Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 436.
259. See, e.g. Johnson, supra note 14, at 706 (describing the Clean Water Act).
260. See United States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d 75 (lst Cir.) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1089
(1982) (town within Passamaquoddy township is an Indian community); United States v. Cook,
92 F.2d 1026 (2d. Cir.) cert. denied, 500 U.S. 541 (1991); Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie,
856 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1988) (tribal tax only valid on communities identified as within Indian
Country); United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971) (Navajo "satellite community"
is a dependent Indian community subject to federal jurisdiction); see also Kahanu & Van Dyke,
supra note 7, at 431, 433.
261. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153
(1980) ("[T]ribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government,
not the States.").
262. Campbell, supra note 14, at 104.
263. For a particularly insightful account of these conflicts from the aboriginal perspective,
see Brown, supra note 74 passim.




1. Historical Congressional Actions
Eighteenth-century federal treatment towards tribes reached a nadir with the
Indian General Allotment Act.m That Act took the tribal lands held in trust
by the federal government and distributed them to tribal members -
homestead-style, 160 acres per person.' One of the rationales of the Act was
that owning and tilling one's own land would make the Indians become as
"civilized" as the white settlers and immigrants that increasingly surrounded
them. Because another rationale was the need to open up land for these
"pioneers," lands leftover from the allotment process - often a large percentage
of reservation land - was then offered to non-Indians.' Even worse, tribal
leaders did not control what sections of their reservations were allotted to tribal
members; federal officials, nominally charged with protecting aboriginal
interests, frequently allotted the worst land and reserved prime agricultural land
as "surplus" for non-Indians.
The allotment policy was tempered with the enactment of the Indian
Reorganization Act' (IRA) in 1934. The functions of the IRA are comparable
to those of Canada's Indian Act.a The IRA facilitated the creation of formal
tribal governments, and succeeding programs were often earmarked for IRA
tribes.2"' As with the Indian Act, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior has veto
powers over proposed tribal governments' powers and structure. Tribal powers
incorporated in tribal constitutions are limited to certain spheres, therefore
resembling municipal authorities in a way comparable once again to First
Nations under the Indian Act.'
In another parallel with Canadian legislative actions towards aboriginal
population, the United States adopted an explicit policy of "termination" for
tribes in the period following World War ILY' Like a pendulum swinging
back, twentieth-century termination mimicked the repudiated allotment doctrine
of the previous century - the stated goal of the termination policy being the
eventual elimination of Native Americans as a distinct class within the U.S.
government system. Tribes were unilaterally dissolved by Congress; members
265. Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), repealed by 25
U.S.C. § 461 (1994).
266. Getches, supra note 24, at 1584.
267. Id. at 1622-23. The policy, of course, failed; Indians often either left their lands fallow
or (despite statutory restrictions to the contrary) quickly sold their property interest to
carpetbagging speculators. Id at 1623.
268. Id. at 1584.
269. Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-476, 478-479 (1994).
270. See supra Part II.C.2 for a discussion of Canada's Indian Act.
271. Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 431. Non-IRA tribal governments have been
recognized by the courts, but they might not have access to some federal funds. Id.
272. See supra notes 133-38, 148 and accompanying text; Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note
7, at 431.
273. Campbell, supra note 14, at 104.
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of terminated tribes became "ordinary" citizens of the states in which their
former reservations layY4 Before the termination policy ended in the 1960s,
109 tribes, with a total of 11,466 members, had been voided by congressional
action."
2. Contemporary Congressional Actions
he late 1960s and early 1970s saw a redressing of aboriginal grievances in
the United States. A key example of this change is the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act (ANCSA), a congressional act comparable to the Canadian
practice of reaching land claim agreements with aboriginal bands having
outstanding land claims tm ANCSA transferred $962.5 million and title to
almost 69,000 square miles (just over 12% of the state's area) to 200 aboriginal
groupstm ANCSA set up twelve tribal corporations, under Alaskan state law,
to control the land that the act transferred to the aboriginal population.' By
assuming the corporate form, aboriginal bands qua bands hold title to the land,
rather than having individual aborigines hold title to particular parcels.
However, this restricts the land's alienability,n and raises uncertainties as to
what is clone with the land if and when a corporation is dissolved. ' In
addition, the precise form the corporation takes is important; a for-profit ori-
entation will negatively impact the aboriginal corporation government's efforts
to provide social services.' However, Congress or state legislatures creating
corporations for non-federally recognized tribes can take these factors into
account when designing the corporate legislationm
The Indian Civil Rights Acttm another congressional act supportive of
aboriginal rights, to some degree parallels section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982, as it pertains to aboriginal rights generally. The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, has restricted the extension of civil rights to individual Indians,
arguing that "the application of the conventional constitutional standards of equal
274. Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 453.
275. Campbell, supra note 14, at 104.
276. Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629a (1994). The
Narragansett Indians in Rhode Island and the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot Indians in Maine
provide additional examples of tribal governments taking the form of state-chartered corporations,
Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 434-36, 460.
277. See infra Parts II.D-F for a discussion of land claims agreements.
278. Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 433.
279. i.
280. Ud.; Campbell, supra note 14, at 106.
281. Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 433.
282. Id. at 433-34, 436-37 (noting that the corporation's "internal self-government ... may
not be appropriate if the tribe does not have exclusive jurisdiction over [its] land").
283. See, e.g. Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 435, 454-55 & 459-62 (noting that
several states have allowed non-federally recognized tribes to incorporate as corporations or
municipalities).




protection and due process would undermine [a] tribe's status as a 'culturally and
politically distinct entity' ... [and] the promotion of Indian self-determination
[is] more important than 'providing in wholesale fashion for the extension of
constitutional requirements to tribal governments.""'z Whether this view has
consistently been held by the Court is open to some debate. Nevertheless,
Congress has not passed legislation expressing disagreement with this reasoning.
Indeed a contemporary piece of legislation is the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act,z' in which Congress recognized that "Indian people
will never surrender their desire to control their relationship both among
themselves and with non-Indian governments."' This Act lets tribal gov-
ernments manage federal programs directly, removing the Bureau of Indian
Affairs as an intermediary?' Though enacted by the Bush administration, the
Act reflects a longer-term (if still fairly recent) federal policy in support of
aboriginal self-government.' As Noelle Kahanu & Jon Van Dyke note,
"Indian tribes do not have to conform to the model established in the U.S.
Constitution. They need not necessarily have, for instance, a republican form
of government, a government with a separation of powers, or a prohibition
against the establishment of religion." 9' One area where Congress and the
Court have given Indian jurisdiction particularly wide control is adoption, as this
is seen as relating to a concept - tribal membership - that is at the core of
aboriginal concerns.'e
Central to all of these congressional acts, however, has been the federal
oversight role. "It is one thing for the Congress to permit tribal Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them. It is quite another for the Congress to
permit tribes to exercise general governmental powers without general Federal
supervision."' Skeptics (some would say realists) point out that Congress'
285. BORDEwiCH, supra note 9, at 87 (quoting Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49
(1978)).
286. Compare Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 428 (noting that in the United States
"[j]udicial recognition of Indian tribal sovereignty is constantly being tested, and a majority of
the present Supreme Court appears to favor limiting the sovereignty of Indian tribes") with
Campbell, supra note 14, at 114.
287. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-
458hh (1994).
288. BORDEWIcH, supra note 9, at 84.
289. Id. at 57.
290. See, e.g., Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987) ("We have
repeatedly recognized the Federal Government's longstanding policy of encouraging tribal self-
government.").
291. Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 437-38.
292. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 41-42 (1989) (citing
the Indian Child Welfare Act as a source of authority for tribal jurisdiction, but adding that such
jurisdiction "is not a novelty of the ICWA" and citing pre-ICWA cases); see also Iowa Mutual
Ins., 480 U.S. at 14 ("Indian tribes retain 'attributes of sovereignty over both their members and
their territory.'" (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
293. BORDEWICH, supra note 9, at 85 (quoting Rep. Lloyd Meeks in 1977).
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strong control over Indian affairs would not have occurred without Supreme
Court acquiescence;' the Court has stated that tribal sovereignty "exists only
at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. '9 With
Congress's plenary power over Native Americans, any and all forms of tribal
self-government could theoretically be abolished "overnight."' While true,
such extreme actions are unlikely from a realism perspective; congressional
abrogation of state-chartered corporate and municipal forms of tribal
organization would be even more difficult for Congress to alter - if not
unconstitutional.
D. Native Hawaiians and the Hawaiian Islands
Until just over a century ago the government of Hawaii had been among the
select club of non-European nations to resist colonization. The independence of
the Hawaiian monarchy was recognized in treaties with European powers' as
well as the United States?' Prior to any contact with Europeans, the
governing system of the Hawaiian Islands (Hawai'i Net) consisted of a feudal-
like system of chiefdoms and communal lands. The islanders' first European
contact was Captain James Cook in 1778."° Within a few decades, King
Kamehameha I had unified the entire archipelago under his control - partially
with the assistance of European military advice in the form of two captured
sailors from Cook's ship."'
Over the next fifty years European trading and commercial pressure on the
royal government was strong,' and in 1848 the traditional land tenure system
was altered (in the Ka Mahele or "Great Mahele") into a scheme more favorable
to private property and the alienation of land.' Further outside pressure led
294. See generally Getches, supra note 24.
295. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
296. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling Federal and State Power Inside Indian Reservations
with the Right of Tribal Self-Government and the Process of Self-Determination, 1995 UTAH L.
REv. 1105, 1106 (1995) [hereinafter Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling] (emphasis added to
paraphrase).
297. Trask, supra note 43, at 80.
298. Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 228 n.11; Boyle, supra note 43, at 727.
299. S. James Anaya, The Native Hawaiian People and International Human Rights Law:
Toward a Remedy for Past and Continuing Wrongs, 28 GA. L. REv. 309, 313 (1994). Recall the
connection (and distinction) between aboriginal land claims and sovereignty claims. See supra
notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
300. Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 227-28.
301. Joseph D. Gebhardt, Native Hawaiian Land Rights in the Context of the Native
Hawaiian Sovereignty Movement, 8 ARIz. J. INttL & Comp. L. 265, 265 (1991).
302. Trask, supra note 43, at 78 (noting that "[i]n the twenty years between 1824 and 1844,
over fift foreign man-of-war ships came to our shores, many threatening to take over our
islands."); Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 229.
303. Anaya, supra note 299, at 314; Trask, supra note 43, at 78 (In the Ka Mahele the
monarch received approximately 1 million acres of land, the 245 lesser chiefs about 1.6 million




to more changes in government. In 1876 the "Bayonet Constitution" was
adopted by King Kalakaua, limiting the monarch's power and restricting suffrage
to Hawaiians who owned property. Because of the nature of the land
distribution in the Ka Mahele, this voting restriction fell heavily on Native
Hawaiians, as opposed to European or American immigrants to the islands, most
of whom owned some property.'
One's view of these preannexation actions by Kamehameha and his heirs
varies depending on one's goal. Native Hawaiian advocates argue that the
unification was "instrumental" in preserving Hawaiian culture over the next
century.' A counter argument could be made: with the mere arrival of
European influence and Kamehameha's seizure of other chiefs' fiefdoms, the
Islands' culture was irrevocably altered from its original, aboriginal norm; in
conjunction with further developments before annexation this means that history-
based self-determination claims should be somewhat suspectax
Kalakaua's successor, Queen Liliuokalani, attempted to restore the monarchy's
power in 1891. Her actions were met with a coup d'etat organized by the
American ambassador and American businessmen living on the islands, and
backed up with U.S. Marines operating without orders (save those of the
businessmen).' Seeing the potential for great violence, the Queen con-
ditionally abdicated and placed her fate, and that of her people, in American
hands "until such time as the government of the United States shall, upon the
facts being presented to it, undo the action of [the coup leaders] and reinstate
[the Queen] as the constitutional sovereign."' Sensing success, the coup
leaders petitioned Congress for annexation, but ran up against the strong oppo-
sition of President Cleveland, who called Liliuokalani's overthrow "an act of
war, committed... without the authority of Congress" and "a substantial
wrong... we should endeavor to repair."' Recent congressional legislation
supports Cleveland's interpretation of the coup against Liliuokalani.1
304. Trask, supra note 43, at 78. The effects of the Ka Mahele and the Hawaiian
constitutions are still felt today in some settings. See Rob Perez, Title Claims Block Isle Land
Deals, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Jan.8, 1997, at 3.
305. Anaya, supra note 299, at 314. In the century following Cook's contact, the Native
Hawaiian population dropped 87% due to European diseases. Id. at 316.
306. See supra note 36 (quoting BORDmwICH, supra note 9, on the validity of aboriginal
governments' claims to legitimacy); Gebhardt, supra note 301, at 266 ("The Great Mahele
was ... part of the beginning of old HawaiTs undoing."); Hawaii's Sovereignty #1: The Apology
Law (Voice of America radio broadcast, Nov. 12, 1996) (describing the ethnic composition
change as "gradual]") [hereinafter VOA #I]; Cf DE JOUVENEL, supra note 29 (noting the
subjective nature of the labels "conqueror" and "conquered").
307. Chock, supra note 42, at 465; Trask, supra note 43, at 79. This section also draws upon
the congressional findings of fact in Overthrow of Hawaii Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N (107 Stat.) 1510.
308. Chock, supra note 42, at 465.
309. Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 229-30.
310. See infra note 329.
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
In the face of the Cleveland administration's intransigence, the Americans
responsible for the coup declared an independent "Republic of Hawaii," though
their goal continued to be annexation by the United States. Five years later,
under t e new McKinley administration and the expansionist mood that followed
the Spanish-American War, Congress approved a new annexation request and
Hawaii became a territory of the United States. Throughout this period, and
especially in recent years, Native Hawaiians have worked to reclaim their
sovereign powers and exercise greater self-determination.
The resolution annexing the islands placed all "Republic of Hawaii" lands
(formerly lands of the monarch and chiefs) with the federal government, to be
used "'solely for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for
educational and other public purposes."''" According to the Supreme Court,
this phrasing created a trust for all of the islands' inhabitants, not just Native
Hawaiians?" A generation later, Congress set aside 193,000 acres of this
public land specifically to "rehabilitate" Native Hawaiians, who lived in poverty
akin to that of their mainland counterparts, through homesteading and
agriculture.
The Territory of Hawaii became a state in 1959, and with statehood botl
land trusts were transferred to the state government."' (Native Hawaiian
activists note that before the statehood vote, the Territory of Hawaii was listed
as a "non-self-governing" territory under article 73 of the U.N. Charter; as such
the jurisdiction should have been offered an "independence" option in the
statehood vote, but this was not done."5 The United Nations, however, did
formally recognize the validity of the Hawaiian statehood vote as meeting the
self-determination requirements of article 73.)316 The state's Admission Act
recognized a distinction in the trusts' beneficiaries between the islands' general
inhabitants and the Native Hawaiians, but did not specify how to divide the
trust. As a result the state and federal administrators have generally used the
trust lands to benefit the general public, rather than Native Hawaiians
specifically 7 In addition, the federal government can, and has, reserved parts
of the trust lands for other purposes."'
311. Bradley Hideo Keikiokalani Cooper, A Trust Divided Cannot Stand - An Analysis of
Native -rawaiian Land Rights, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 699 (1994).
312. Keikiokalani Cooper, supra note 311, at 699-700.
313. Anaya, supra note 299, at 315-16; Keikiokalani Cooper, supra note 311, at 700 (citing
the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920,42 Stat. 108 (1921) (repealed); Trask, supra note
43, at 80.
314. Anaya, supra note 299, at 316-17; Keikiokalani Cooper, supra note 311, at 700-01;
Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 231 n.23.
315. tallchief Skibine, Reconciling, supra note 296, at 1107; VOA #1, supra note 310.
316. G.A. Res. 1469, U.N. GAOR 4th Comm., 14th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/4343 (1959).
317. Trask, supra note 43, at 81.




By 1983 only 38,000 acres were being used for these purposes, with the
remainder used either for public purposes or held by non-Native Hawaiians."9
Approximately 18,000 people remained on waiting lists for homesteads,"m
while non-Native Hawaiians continued to own the vast majority of private
property in the state."' This historical and contemporary portrait bears striking
similarities to that of the Mdtis in Manitoba.m
E. The Sovereignty Movement
Native Hawaiians currently make up a minority of the state's population, at
just over 12%. The largest ethnic group in the state are Asian-Americans, who
make up almost 48% of the state's population?' This compares to the Inuit
being the substantial majority of the population in the future Territory of
Nunavut." In percentage terms, however, the Native Hawaiian population
represents the largest aboriginal population of any U.S. state.32 Culturally,
almost 28% of Hawaiian households speak an Asian or Pacific Island language;
almost a quarter of such households consider themselves "linguistically
isolated. 0
26
Currently Native Hawaiians do not even have the same basic sovereignty
recognition that is afforded to mainland tribes.3 Although Native Hawaiians
can make a very strong argument for sovereignty, based on the history of their
occupation and independent governance of the islands until 1893,1z Native
Hawaiians are denied many of the aspects of sovereignty, up to and especially
including control over their land base, that mainland tribes in Canada and the
United States claim as an inherent right. They have no distinct recognition as
a people, and therefore face more state (as opposed to federal) control. This
compares unfavorably with the status accorded even Alaskan aboriginal groups
who, like the Native Hawaiians, came under U.S. jurisdiction through a different
means than the mainland tribes. Alaskan aborigines "have the same status as
other federally recognized American Indians" because of the 1867 cession treaty
by which the United States gained control of Alaska from Russia.3"
319. Trask, supra note 43, at 80.
320. Gebhardt, supra note 301, at 267.
321. Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 230 (quoting the Hawaii Supreme Court as observing that
"[t]he state and federal governments and the largest 72 private landowners own approximately
95 percent of all land area").
322. See supra notes 111-13, 203 and accompanying text.
323. U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 Census Lookup (1.4) (visited Mar. 26, 1997), <http://
venus.census.gov/cdromllookup/859383903>.
324. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
325. Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 230 n.19.
326. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 323 (the language figures are not further broken down
between Asian and Pacific Islander households).
327. Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 231.
328. See supra Parts .C and III.D for a discussion of independent island governance.
329. Alaska Chapter, Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162, 1168
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Improvements in the Hawaiians' situation have come slowly, and have
centered thus far on state action. In 1978 the State of Hawaii amended its
constitution to create the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), an agency managed
by Native Hawaiians who are elected in special elections by the Native
Hawaiian population?3" OHA oversees the allocation of and income from the
Native Hawaiian trust lands?"' Native Hawaiians felt that this was an
important step towards regaining control over their lands and lives - though
by no means was it the end of their efforts.
An achievement with far greater psychological significance came in 1993,
when Congress passed a resolution, signed by President Clinton, that
acknowledged the illegal role the U.S. government played in the overthrow of
the Hawaiian monarchy and the state's annexation.3' The adoption of this law
followed over two decades of lobbying by Native Hawaiians.333 Success in the
halls of Congress spurred the movement, and after lobbying the state agreed to
form the Hawaiian Sovereignty Elections Commission (HSEC) to oversee a
referendum on the sovereignty question. HSEC was made up of twenty
members, nominated by "various Hawaiian organizations" and appointed by the
governor?
The referendum question was open-ended regarding what would be meant by
an 'ae or "yes" vote for sovereignty. Before the referendum, however, OHA
prepared three "options" that a sovereignty convention would consider. First, a
"state within a state" option, whereby a Native Hawaiian government would be
akin to a local (municipal) government. Second, a "nation within a nation"
option, whereby Native Hawaiians would achieve status comparable to mainland
tribes and not be subordinate to the State of Hawaii in all matters. Finally, an
option of potential independence from the United States.3 Part IV dicusses
these goals in more detail.
The results of the referendum were overwhelmingly in favor of Native
Hawaiian sovereignty?' Yet the Native Hawaiian sovereignty movement has
not coalesced around any one of the three possible goals.33 Some argue that
(9th Cir. 1981).
330. Anaya, supra note 299, at 317.
331. Id.
332. Overthrow of Hawaii Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N (107 Stat.)
1510.
333. VOA #1, supra note 310.
334. Hawaiian Sovereignty Elections Commission, HSEC (visited Mar. 8, 1997) <http:ll
planet-hawaii.com/hsec>.
335. Hawaii Sovereignty #3: What Model? (Voice of America radio broadcast, Nov. 14,
1996) [hereinafter VOA #3].
336. See supra note 1.
337. See Pa Martin, supra note 8, at 281 ("The Hawaiian native community is comprised of
individuals with diverse philosophies .... rangling] from those who believe it is unrealistic and
impractical to advocate for independence from the United States to those who refuse to




status comparable to mainland tribes is an appropriate target, or alternatively
status as a corporation such as that granted Alaskan natives, or in a municipal
form as in the eastern U.S. states?' Others disagree, vowing that "the only
true sovereignty is independence." '339  Semantically they are correct. As
Getches notes, true sovereignty entails control over all within one's
boundaries,' while tribal jurisdiction over non-tribal members, including other
Indians, is quite limited. Even the question of whether this vote supported a
constitutional convention was debated by Native Hawaiian activists. HSEC
members saw the vote as an endorsement of the next step in the process - a
constitutional convention - but some pro-sovereignty anti-referendum activists
saw the low rate of response as supporting calls to boycott the vote."4 (Those
calls were issued over controversy surrounding the role of the state government
in supporting the referendum. Some saw this as an effort by the state to appear
accommodating and to deflate Native Hawaiian energy. 2 That the state
government has thus far refused to fund calls for a convention would seem to
support this latter view.) 3
IV. The Nunavut Model and Hawaiian Reality
It is now time for constructive destruction of the status quo.
- An Inuit Leader'
The preceding discussion shows the many parallels between Canadian and
American aboriginal policies, both historic and contemporary, and aboriginal
populations, again both historic and contemporary. While the interplay of these
338. See Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 428 ("Many Hawaiians ... want to develop
a status that provides more autonomy than that provided to Indians and other Native
Americans."); Ka Lahui Hawai'i, Ka Lahui Hawai'i (visited Mar. 8, 1997) <http://kalahui.org>
(grassroots Native Hawaiian group seeking a "Nation to Nation" relationship with the U.S. federal
government, similar to that of mainland tribes, and opposed to complete independence).
339. Pu'uhonua "Bumpy" Kanahele, Voices of Sovereignty, HONOLULU ADvERTIsER, Oct.
11, 1994, at 61 (Kanahele is the head of the aboriginal advocacy group "Nation of Hawai'i, see
infra); see also Hayden Burgess, Hawaii Independence: Voters Weren't Offered This Option,
HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Dec. 27, 1992, at B3 (arguing that the 1959 statehood vote was marred
by the lack of a choice for independence, and urging independence as a Native Hawaiian goal);
Nation of Hawai'i, Hawai'i Independent & Sovereign (visited Mar. 8, 1997) <http'J/www.hawaii-
nation.orglindex.html> (web site "offered to provide information regarding the restoration of
Hawaiian independence); cf. Boyle, supra note 43, at 723 (comparing the Native Hawaiian
situation to that of the unilateral Palestinian declaration of independence in 1988).
340. See supra note 24.




344. Morse, supra note 8, at 683 (identifying the speaker only as "an Inuit leader").
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factors has led to varied forms of aboriginal government in both countries, even
peoples as separated as the Inuit and Native Hawaiians have sufficient
commonality to allow for reasonable comparison and contrast. Yet, at a
structural level one could rebut this presentation by highlighting the strong
distinctions between the Inuit and Native Hawaiians, and between Canada and
the United States. Therefore assessing the applicability of the Nunavut model
to Native Hawaiians today depends not only on the commonalities and parallels
already discussed, but also on the precise nature of Native Hawaiian goals -
obtaining tribal status under the United States, declaring complete independence
from the United States, or creating a semiautonomous jurisdiction within the
larger federal framework of the United States.' a
A. Equal Status with Mainland Tribes
The first potential Native Hawaiian goal, status as a tribe or a tribal
corporation, or alternately as a state municipality, seems quite feasible. Tribal
status would center on creating a government with which Congress could
interact and under which Congress could restore Native Hawaiian control over
their traditional land base.' This government would thereafter be the contact
point for future interaction, as opposed to going through the State of Hawaii, as
well as the source of internal regulations. The U.S. government could provide
some sort of funding (whether lump-sum, transitional, or permanent) to the
Native 'Hawaiian government. Depending on the exact structure, tribe versus
corporation, the lands currently held by the OHA and other lands could be
transfered to the United States to hold in trust for the new Native Hawaiian
government (as are mainland tribes' lands), or to the new Native Hawaiian
corporation. Because tribal lands are held in trust, only the corporate form of
land title holding would be comparable to the land control status reached in the
NLCA in Canada.
Alternatively, if Congress does not wish to act in this manner, or is unable
to act, the State of Hawaii (which in recent years has shown itself to be
somewhat flexible regarding Native Hawaiian claims) could create one or more
state-chartered municipalities as agents for holding the lands currently managed
by the OHA. This too might require congressional action to be fully workable,
however, since it is Congress which passed control of the former royal Hawaiian
lands to the state with the Statehood Act. Instead of, or in addition to, creating
towns, the state could follow Maine's model and grant dedicated seats in its
legislature to the Native Hawaiian people. This would ensure that their voice is
heard in the government that manages their lands and most intimately controls
their affairs, even though they remain federally unrecognized.
345. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
346. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of contemporary actions Congress has taken with




Sadly, the applicability of the Nunavut Act towards these tribal-oriented goals
is nil. The NLCA may be of more marginal utility, in that it discusses the
ownership and control of land uses by a North American aboriginal people,
although the Inuit settlement does so in a very different context. The Inuit
settlement has a strikingly different geography and climate, a much more recent
(and less abrogated) land claim, an environment where nonaborigines are in the
minority, and very large swaths of undeveloped property remaining available for
title transference. Far more important than the NLCA to any Native Hawaiian
tribal-status endeavor, however, would be the hundreds of precedents already
established within the United States for interacting with its tribes, and especially
the ANCSA and Indian Self-Determination Act. One Native Hawaiian group,
Ka Lahui Hawai'i, recognizes this, noting that it "seeks inclusion of the
Hawaiian people in the existing U.S. federal policy which affords all Native
Americans the right to be self-governing .... "M
Ironically the Nunavut Act and NLCA may be of more utility regarding the
creation of native municipal governments or granting Native Hawaiians seats in
the legislature. This is so because the structure of the Canadian federal/Inuit
relationship is comparable to that of the state government to Native
Hawaiians - the state controls the land base, and has wide-ranging authority
to act within its borders regarding nonrecognized aborigines, in much the same
way that the Canadian parliament has wide-ranging authority to legislate for the
Northwest Territories, up to and including severing them in 1999. Such strong
actions could not be taken by the Canadian federal governments towards
Canadian provinces, and similarly the State of Hawaii would be much more
constrained to interact with its aboriginal population in a creative manner if the
Native Hawaiians were recognized as a tribe by the U.S. federal government.
B. Independence
The Nunavut Act is also somewhat more applicable to the goal at the other
end of the spectrum - complete independence. The creation of the Territory
of Nunavut shows (and hopefully, its successful operation will demonstrate) that
aboriginally based governments can be formed by combining aboriginal and
Western notions of governance. However, here too there are a plenitude of
examples closer to the Native Hawaiian setting than actions in the Canadian
Arctic - for example, the many new, ex-colonial states of the Pacific, Asia,
and Africa, including several created from former United States territories or
trust territories.
347. Ka Lahui Hawaii, Frequently Asked Questions (visited Mar. 8, 1997) <http.//
kalahui.orglfaq.html>; see also Kahanu & Van Dyke, supra note 7, at 428 ("The Native Hawaiian
claim to sovereignty is based largely upon established precedents related to Native Americans in
North America.").
348. E.g., The Philippines, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic
of the Marshall Islands, etc. See Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling, supra note 296, at 1107-08.
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The broader, underlying problem for Native Hawaiians, and aboriginal or
ethnic minorities generally, is that international law draws a categorical
distinction between the right to independence and self-determination as claimed
by former colonies, on the one hand, and the absence of such a right for ethnic
minorities within the borders of existing sovereign states. Modem self-
determination doctrine simply does not transfer to the aboriginal situation. The
problem is one of timing and perspective. One could imagine a spectrum of
situations of ethnic peoples, ranging from one or more ethnic groups living
within a single colonial territory (such as the various island cultures in former
Pacific trust territories of the United States), through groups living within an
unorganized territory of a sovereign state (the current situation of the Inuit in
Canada), or an organized ethnic minority within a fully integrated subdivision
of a sovereign state (the status of most mainland tribes in the United States), to
an unorganized, unrecognized ethnic group living within that subdivision (the
situation of the Native Hawaiians in the State of Hawaii). By many measures
the Native Hawaiian claim to sovereignty and independence is as strong as those
of colonial peoples in former U.S. "non-self-governing" territories, such as the
Northern Mariana Islands or the Republic of the Marshall Islands. 9 It seems
odd from a normative perspective that one group, Native Hawaiians, should be
prevented from exercising complete and independent sovereignty and self-
determination simply because they are making their claim today, rather than in
the period before Hawaii became a state of the United States?" Yet from a
realist perspective few would argue that the disjunction in this spectrum created
by the categorical distinction is not indeed the case. Therefore, achieving
independence would first require overcoming this international law hurdle.
Further examination of this point is useful. Following the end of World War
1I, Canada, the United States, and other states called on the European imperial
powers to give up their colonies. Where nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
political thought had seen the system of colonies and trust territories as a means
of shepherding "uncivilized" peoples to statehood,"' an "extremely rapid"
change led to a "virtually complete" decolonization process by the 1960s."
While ex-colonial sovereignty was based on a notion of a universal doctrine of
349. See Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling, supra note 296, at 1107-08; see also Anaya, supra
note 299, el 315 (implicitly arguing that Hawaii still merits treatment as a colony, because before
statehood "Hawaii [was] a territory of the United States among the ranks of colonial territories
of other Western powers driven by the forces of empire").
350. See Anaya, supra note 299, at 371 (arguing that the "substantive elements" of the self-
determination principle "have been violated" and, when combined with "human rights norms...
that are related to the principle of self-determination" a valid Native Hawaiian claim exists.).
351. See JACKSON, supra note 19, at 86. Jackson describes the British Empire's belief as
being that some colonies were "too small" for independence or had "little or no understanding
of the workings of a modem state"; moreover for Britain "decolonization meant achieving self-
government within the Empire." Id. at 86-87 (emphasis added).




self-determination for colonial peoples, this association "did not presuppose
underlying nationhood but only subject colonial status." 3n
The self was no longer either historical or ethnic 'nations' but
artificial ex-colonial jurisdictions' which were multi-ethnic entities
in most cases .... The self was not determined by plebiscites and
virtually no concern was shown for minorities. Determination came
down to the eviction of alien European rulers and the assertion of
majority rule.. ..
That is, self-determination was categorical: if colony, then independent; if ethnic
grouping within a larger sovereign jurisdiction, then not independent.
Making colonial self-determination categorical accomplished two ends. First,
by denying exceptions or modifications to take into account individual colonies'
preparedness for independence, the decolonizing process established that each
colony would become independent within the territorial boundaries established
by the Europeans."5 Second, and more importantly, the categorical line
allowed governments to distinguish between colonials in colonies and aborigines
(and ethnic minorities) in the dominant state's territory.3 "Self-determination"
as a doctrine of international law was not meant to demand actual independence
for each possible ethnic group or aboriginal population,3" and the categorical
distinction "serve[d] as a bulwark against demands for self-determination by
domestic ethnonational groups."3  U.S. Sen. Slade Gorton (R.-Wash.)
implicitly acknowledged the importance of this distinction during the debate
over Public Law 103-150.?" Recognizing the illegality of Hawaii's annexation,
he argued, established a dangerous legal precedent because "every square inch
353. Id. at 75.
354. IkL at 78. The implication of this categorical definition of self-determination, of course,
was that some colonies would be "abandon[ed] ... against their will." Id. at 86. A similar
predicament faces North American aboriginal advocates, who recognize that not all tribes or First
Nations want, or are capable of, complete independence. See also Markus B. Heyder, The
International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility: Draft Article 19 and
Native American Self-Determination, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAI'L L. 155, 164-65 (1994).
355. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 41; Ratner, supra note 57, at 590 (adding that this territory-
based decolonizing principle, or uti possidetis, applied not only to post-World War II
decolonization, but also the earlier decolonization in the Western Hemisphere and the post-Cold
War breakup of the Soviet Union and Central European states).
356. Valencia-Weber, supra note 244, at 1300. But see VOA #3, supra note 335 (stating that
under the "blue water" doctrine Hawaii was considered a U.S. colony by the U.N. until 1959,
when the territory became a state (but cf. Part II.D (noting U.N. approval of the Hawaiian
statehood vote))).
357. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 41.
358. Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
359. See supra note 332 and accompanying text for a discussion of these debates.
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of the [United States] was acquired in a manner which bears certain similarities
to the acquisition by the United States of what is now the State of Hawaii. "'3w
Not only academicians and politicians but also the U.N. General Assembly
embrace this categorical distinction between colonies and noncolonial groups:
"any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations."' " Later U.N. documents have
confirmed that the Charter's reference to "peoples" and the right of self-
determination does not include indigenous peoples.' Unlike the praise heaped
on "liberationists" fighting colonial regimes, the international community deri-
sively refers to aborigines who continue to press for self-determination outside
of the decolonizing setting as "separatists," "secessionists," or "irredentists.""3
Those groups
are consequently frustrated by the rules of the new sovereignty
game which not only exclude them but give no sign of allowing
them to play in the future. The accidents of imperial history
consign them to the role of unwilling spectators even where they
may actually be in effective control of territory.'
Unfortunately for those who advocate Native Hawaiian independence from
the United States, the application of the categorical distinction to aboriginal
groups, or rather its nonapplication, is unlikely to change soon. Both the newer,
developing world states in the Pacific, Asia, and Africa, and the older, ex-
colonial states of the New World "are understandably united and determined to
bar ethnonationalities from the club [of independent states] because if they were
admitted it would involve loss ofjurisdiction over the territories in question and
remaking of international frontiers."' If the right of having an independent
state were granted to every aboriginal or ethnic group, "most existing ex-
colonial states would be broken up just as the Austro-Hungarian empire was
broken up by granting self-determination to the nationalities of Central
360. VOA #1, supra note 310.
361. U.N.G.A. Res. 1514.
362. Russell Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of
International Law?, 7 HARV. HUM. Rrs. J. 33, 37-38 (1994) (arguing instead that the term
.peoples" should be liberally construed).
363. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 41-42 (citing the Palestinians as "among the very few
dispossessed nationalities that have achieved an anomalous quasi-sovereignty.").
364. Id at 41-42. Any recognition of aboriginal or ethnic states created by force will only
be recognized "if [other states] have received prior recognition from the sovereign governments
involved." ld. at 153. But see Ratner, supra note 57, at 590 (arguing that "international law de-
clares the lack of either a blanket right to, or prohibition against, secession ... relegat[ing] its
achievement to a pure power calculus" and that the U.N. states "accept accomplished breakups
after the fact").
365. Id. at 42, 190 (citing "an international determination to retain the existing political




Europe."' If this analysis is correct, independence for Native Hawaiians is
not an option under the self-determination doctrine.
Even some Native Hawaiian sovereignty advocates recognize that realistically
the odds of achieving independence would be quite small - and that the Native
Hawaiian movement is hindered by those who push for so extreme a solution,
and should instead concentrate its energies on more achievable goals.'
(An interesting question that follows quite easily from the logic of the
categorical distinction is whether Canada's decision to create the distinct
Territory of Nunavut in 1999 will in the end compromise the Canadian federal
government's efforts to maintain Canadian unity. By establishing defined
borders and an aboriginal-majority territorial government, Canada may be
creating the necessary conditions precedent for a valid Inuit claim to full
independence down the road.)'
Conclusion
Part IV.A noted the relative legal (if not political) ease which would
accompany the establishment of Native Hawaiians as a tribe or a municipal
corporation. Yet this is not the solution that many Native Hawaiians seek. On
the other hand, Part IV.B showed that the alternative desired by some Native
Hawaiian advocates - independence - is legally untenable and unlikely to
occur, even through the (extremely unlikely) use of force.3" With the two
extremes removed from the set of potential solutions, any remaining proposals
to address the Native Hawaiian claim will have to occur within the existing (or
perhaps a modified) U.S. federal system. Here the Nunavut model of a new,
distinct but equal jurisdiction may be of more utility to Native Hawaiians.
Some have argued that "Indian aspirations to political autonomy [threaten]
to create a new third sphere of sovereignty that was never contemplated by the
U.S. Constitution" and that "[w]hile [the sovereignty movement] is giving much-
needed flexibility to tribes, it is also creating a hodgepodge of economically, and
perhaps politically, unviable states whose role in the United States is glaringly
undefined in the U.S. Constitution."" Yet this sentiment not only ignores the
very nature of any federal system, but it also ignores the U.S. Constitution itself,
which sets the stage for determining the status of Indians within the U.S.
366. Id. at 78 (terming the chances of existing states being divided to accommodate
aboriginal sovereignty "bleak").
367. VOA #3, supra note 335.
368. Cf. Ratner, supra note 57, at 591. Ratner notes that "a policy or rule that transforms
all administrative borders of modem states into international boundaries creates a significant
hazard in the name of simplicity - namely, the temptation of ethnic separatists to divide the
world further along administrative lines." He uses Qudbec as an example of an area the
succession of which may be more easily proposed because of the existing administrative
(provincial) boundaries. Id.
369. See supra note 364.
370. BORDEWICH, supra note 9, at 12, 314.
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system. First, the Constitution, as well as the Articles of Confederation which
preceded it, seem to divide the world into three spheres: states, tribes, and
foreign states.37' The placement of tribes in the middle zone gives one much
more flexibility today to experiment on achieving the most efficient yet
equitable solution to the Native Hawaiian claims. Second, the Constitution by
definition incorporates several sovereign governments - the states - into a
larger federated whole, without abrogating their rights as sovereigns per se.
The role of ethnic minorities within a larger jurisdiction is not a unique
question in the "postmodem" era, nor is it limited to aboriginal concerns. Ghita
Ionescu addresses similar concerns over the integration of the European Union.
"[A]t what level can political cohesion, order and stability best be achieved in
the indusirial age: at the national or at the supra-national level?""1 And
moreover, why and to what ends would any aboriginal group agree to table its
independence demands and focus on integrating within an existing federal
system?
As Chief Justice John Marshall noted, "the settled doctrine of the law of
nations is that a weaker power does not surrender its independence - its right
to self-government, by associating with another and taking its protection. A
weak State, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the
protection of [a] more powerful [state] without stripping itself of the right of
government, and ceasing to be a State."' Indeed this is the very place of
individual states, or associated jurisdictions such as Puerto Rico, within the U.S.
federal system?74 Thus we see that the granting of sovereignty to, or
371. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress authority to regulate interstate
commerce and commerce with Indian tribes, see supra note 232 and accompanying text); cf
ARTICLEs OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (U.S. 1777) ("The United States in Congress assembled
shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of... regulating the trade and managing
all affairs with the Indians, not members of any States."); see also Richard B. Collins, Indian
Consent to American Government, 31 Aiuz. L. REv. 365,381 (1989) (stating that the Constitution
provides protection for aboriginal rights by placing them under the federal, not state, purview, and
(in a related sense) by blunting th& ability of the majority to impose their will on the minority).
372. Ghita lonescu, Between Sovereignty and Integration: Introduction in BETWEEN
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRATION 9 (Ghita lonescu ed., 1975).
373. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6. Pet.) 515, 560-61 (1832) (addressing directly the
question of aboriginal populations within the United States' jurisdiction).
374. See Tallchief Skibine, Recohciling, supra note 296, at 1107-08. He notes:
The United States considers Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and American Samoa
as still 'non-self-governing' for purposes of [U.N. Charter) Article 73 ...By
contrast, the states of Alaska and Hawaii, as well as the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, all of which used to be 'non-self-governing' for purposes of Article 73, have
completed acts of self-determination through which they have resolved the terms
of their respective relationships with the rest of the United States. Similarly, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Federated States of
Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, all of whom were once part
of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, have completed the process of self-
determination [and, Tallchief Skibine should clarify, doing so by choosing
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss2/6
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recognizing the existing sovereignty of, aboriginal peoples can be thought of not
only as a restoration to some prior situation (i.e., when North American abo-
riginal bands operated without European interference), but also (or, perhaps,
simply "instead") as an innovation within international law and domestic
political structures.37
Thus, various possible arrangements of power between the associated
sovereigns individually, and the federal government of them all, lie between the
two extremes of the self-determination spectrum. An indigenous group, for
example, may have the power to enact economic programs but not to organize
itself politically. Indigenous people may receive the right to manage the mineral
and water resources on their land, but not to alienate their land or to organize
their local political bodies 76 Or that group may simply realize that it would
rather have a central government perform certain functions and, in exchange,
absorb certain costs.3" De Jouvenel illustrates this point nicely:
The power inherent in Primus [de Jouvenel's term for an
independent person], which determined his radius of action, gave
him naturally a circular domain within the limits of his radius; but
the effect of social regulations is to forbid him certain regions of
this circular domain - zones which are now darkened and barred
to him. This causes him to lose what Beccaria called 'portions of
liberty', but his loss is profitable to him, for the Sovereign, who
forbids Primus to enter certain zones of his primitive domain,
guarantees him at the same time against anyone invading the rest
of his circle - all the zones that have not been shaded in. Primus,
who would lead a disturbed life as master of a complete circle, is
able to lead a quiet one as master of a truncated circle."
By providing one answer to such possibilities, the Nunavut Act and the
NLCA provide an example of how willing a modem Western government can
be to accommodate internal polities and their civil rights claims.3 From one
independence over integration].
Id.
375. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 78-81.
376. Tores, supra note 10, at 142.
377. See generally Jonathan Rodden & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Preserve
Markets?, 83 VA. L. REv. 1521 (1997) (discussing the market efficiencies that are gained in
hierarchical federal systems through the centralization of externalities and the ability of lower
jurisdictions to experiment with alternative economic strategies).
378. DE JOUVENEL, supra note 29, at 250. De Jouvenel goes on to state, perhaps
unsympathetically, that "the man who is fully aware of the advantages for himself in this barter
of independence for security should in reason cease to desire what is forbidden him" though he
admits that "there is not a man who, at the time of encountering these restrictions, does not feel
differently about them than he did when his reason caused him to promulgate them." Id. at 251.
379. See also Michael Goldfarb, All Things Considered: Scotland Parliament (National
Public Radio broadcast, Apr. 14, 1997) (noting the British Labour Party's willingness to create
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
perspective, such accommodation logically follows from a liberal Western
government's response to internal complaints about representation and self-
determination2w
Congress has plenary authority over aboriginal matters38" ' and also has the
ability, with a given state's consent, to create new states.3 The Executive and
Congress together have quite broad powers to create Cabinet-level positions and
to establish federal enclaves with special rights and duties. In addition the
flexibility of the State of Hawaii,3" though dismissed by some as a strategic
effort to blunt Native Hawaiian strength, also shows a willingness to be creative
and open to the idea of "experimenting" with new forms of jurisdiction. Given
these capabilities, it does not seem too difficult to imagine a scenario in which
Congress and the State of Hawaii agree to some intermediate governmental
structure for the Native Hawaiian community - stronger than a tribe and its
reservation, but not so distinct or strong to be considered a state represented in
Congress. There has already been a great deal of research and academic thought
turned towards the notion of creating some alternative structural relationship
between the federal government and U.S. aborigines - ranging from promoting
pure independence to establishing Puerto Rico-like commonwealths, to creating
distinct Indian states.3" Additional options include granting a Native Hawaiian
government or corporation "veto" powers over state legislation; quite similar
powers are regularly exercised by municipalities in western states in the United
States.3" With the Native Hawaiian claim, among other American aboriginal
sovereignty claims, it is important to distinguish the claim for self-governance
(and potentially independence) from the claim for control over the land base.
Integration of a Native Hawaiian sovereign government within the U.S. federal
system would not mean that the Native Hawaiian land claim has been denied
or destroyed. What is important to tribal, and seemingly Native Hawaiian
governments is that sovereignty has two components: one theoretical, and the
other prtactical.rs Creative solutions can and should allow for solving the
practical problems, by allowing control over the land base and taking care of
a separate Scottish parliament, for the first time in over 300 years, if they win the May 1997
British elections); Howard Schneider, Canada Pressed on Indian Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 22,
1996, at A39 (reporting on a 4000 page report from the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People,
concluding "that Canada start[s] from scratch, renegotiating virtually every aspect of Indian
governance and economics" and recommending, inter alia, "establishment of an extensive set of
new institutions: a House of First Peoples to join the Parliament .... ").
380. Tallchief Skibine, Braid, supra note 296, at 557 ("Pommersheim believes that through
an analysi; of the legal and political status of Indian tribes... we can gauge the dominant
society's commitment to diversity and pluralism.").
381. See supra Part 11I.C.
382. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. I.
383. See supra Part III.E.
384. Getches, supra note 24, at 1581 n.26.
385. GtLnrI , supra note 257, at 1363-65.




"the practical needs of their people," while granting Native Hawaiians (and
perhaps other mainland tribes) some special structural recognition meets the
former component, by supporting "political recognition in international fora."3"
Reaching a federally based or integrated solution to the Native Hawaiian
claims reaches two additional ends, by disconnecting aboriginal sovereignty
claims from the decolonization doctrine of self-determination. First, this
disconnection addresses the concerns of smaller or less ambitious aboriginal
bands who may neither want nor be able to become fully independent."8 Few
mainland tribes have ever, let alone consistently, advocated for independence
from the United States. What Jackson said about the British Empire's views
about its colonial system applies equally to aboriginal bands in the Canadian or
U.S. federal system: "The only practical and responsible course of action [is] the
continuation of colonial development following the distinct lines of each
particular colony under the overall protection, freedom, and justice afforded by
the imperial system.""3 The language sounds brusque and insensitive to our
modem, New World Order ears - but the meaning is really no different than
the message modernists prescribe, namely, treat each aboriginal group as a
unique entity, with its own particular capabilities and needs.
Second, this disconnection conversely could allow additional opportunities
for other large tribes in the United States to exercise greater internal sovereignty
than they are currently allowed by legislation or the courts3 °
A third ameliorative effect would be the removal of the need to determine
non-Native Hawaiians' views about, and possible roles in, independence for the
islands. 9'
Some would counter these arguments by stating that achieving such a
heightened or "special" relationship for Native Hawaiians would be more
problematic in the United States than in Canada. The U.S. federal system differs
from the Canadian one; moreover the relationship between the State of Hawaii
and the U.S. federal government differs from that between the NWT and the
Canadian federal government.3" (Indeed, that latter relationship also differs
from the more typical provincial/federal relationship in Canada, and it is
387. l
388. See supra note 347 (discussing the British view towards categorical colonial self-
determination, and criticizing the view that all colonies were equally ready for independence in
the post-World War II decolonizing period).
389. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 86.
390. See supra Part III.A.
391. VOA #4, supra note 341 (noting that Native Hawaiians themselves have no single view
about the place of non-Native Hawaiians in the independence movement or a possible future
Hawaiian state).
392. The situation would be more comparable if Hawaii were still a territory, over which
jurisdictions Congress has much greater control. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see also
supra Part IV.A (comparing the Canadian federal position vis-,-vis the Inuit to that of the State
of Hawaii and the unrecognized Native Hawaiians).
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
doubtful that the creation of the Territory of Nunavut would have worked
anywhere outside of the Yukon or Northwest Territories.)ym For Native
Hawaiians, any large alterations to the relationship between themselves and the
state and federal governments would require structural changes to the
state/federal system, if not to the U.S. Constitution itself. Politically, others
within the dominant country (for the Inuit, Canada; for Native Hawaiians, the
United States) will oppose accommodating internal groups' concerns? This
opposition could originate from their being invested in the current system (such
as non-Native Hawaiians living in the state) or their membership in other groups
who do not stand to profit from acquiescing to Native Hawaiian concerns (such
as mainland tribal leaders, or leaders of other ethnic, racial, or other minority
communities). Some will say that "[i]t is too late in the day to revisit two
centuries of consistently and firmly reiterated precedent or to expect a basic
reformation of the historical legal relationship of the United States to Indian
tribes." '' Still others on the Native Hawaiian side will oppose accommodation
because they see it as an incomplete response on the part of the United States
to "atone" for its previous improper and illegal actions (such as the annexation
and, arguably, the statehood vote).
De Jouvenel responds to all who oppose finding "creative" solutions within
a Western government's constitutional framework by labeling them "cynics":
Graver by far is the mistake of the cynics .... For the cynics
the birth of a society is due to the violence done to a population by
a band of conquerors who subject them to a social discipline which
is to the conquerors' advantage.
History abounds in instances of conquest. There have been those
which have brought together in a single association societies which
had been till then distinct .... But the strongest proof of the
[cynic's] theory of absurdity is that it offers no explanation of how
the conquering band came to be formed. Those who today conquer
393. See supra note 203 (discussing the creation of the Province of Manitoba); see also
Morse, supra note 8, at 678; see also Youngblood Henderson, supra note 63, at 242, 245
(arguing that "linking treaty federalism with provincial federalism would improve Canadian
federalism, democracy and government" and that "[w]ithout a balance between Aboriginal
perspectives and the Eurocentric view, existing federalism reflects political domination and
oppression built on colonial misunderstandings").
394. See Diane Francis, Time to Get Tough with the Natives, MACLEAN'S, July 10, 1995, at
II (noting increasing sentiment among nonaboriginal Canadians that "the country's bizarre
aboriginal policies" are causing "awesome and overly generous bills" and "special privileges
unfairly awarded to this country's aboriginals"); Bergman, supra note 174, at 20 (quoting a Yukon
business leader who found it "appalling that we should be looking at splitting up our country even
more. We've got better things to spend our money on.").




and bring together others must in some way have been brought
together themselves?'
"[N]othing is more absurd than the defence of an existing social order as
just," de Jouvenel later states. "Justice is a quality, not of social arrangements,
but of the human will.... There is no once-and-for-all scheme of things to be
established and preserved; our own conceits in this respect should be abated by
our poor opinion of the different conceits held by our forefathers."3 In the
end we should not only allow but embrace the experiment, for in de Jouvenel's
words there is "a tension which is immanent in every society whatsoever -
between the advantage of preserving by a sort of mummification the work
accomplished by past natural authorities and the advantage of allowing new
natural authorities arriving on the scene to do their work."'3
Moving beyond the conquer-oriented frame of reference to voluntary
association ("integration")3" allows for recognition of the many positive
benefits that such associations provide. "[I]ntegration - and more particularly
political amalgamation - aims at the creation of a wide range of general
purpose capabilities, often exceeding by an order of magnitude or more the
capabilities of the component states."' The list of other possible goals of
integration includes facilitating trade, improving economic efficiency, creating
economies of scale, and, perhaps more importantly, protecting the rights of other
minorities within the integrated area.
Even Bordewich, so critical of the potential constitutional problems that
aboriginal sovereignty could create, at the same time offers a positive example
of how Americans of all origins can work together: the economic success of the
Choctaw Indians in Mississippi. "It is a story that also suggests that tribal
sovereignty, far from being a universal threat to neighboring non-Indian
communities, has the capacity to become an engine for rural revitalization."
'
As he notes, "Indians and other Americans share not only a common history but
a common future as well .... [T]he long-overdue revival of Indian life will
bring a complete liberation of individual Indian people only if it also leads,
eventually, to a more intimate, trusting, and self-confident participation of
Indians in the larger American society."'
396. DE JOUVENEL, supra note 29, at 29.
397. Id. at 164-65.
398. Id. at 72.
399. "Integration is a process of interpenetration of different degrees of autonomy and...
'is formed by a multiplicity of ranges of social communication.'" Ionescu, supra note 372, at 9.
400, Karl Deutsch, Between Sovereignty and Independence: Conclusion, in BETWEEN
SOVEREIGNTY AND INMRATION 181 (Ghita Ionescu ed., 1974).
401. Ratner, supra note 57, at 592. See generally Rodden & Rose-Ackerman, supra note
377.
402. BORDEwICH, supra note 9, at 303-05.
403, Id. at 20-21.
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